LIMITED MORALITY: GROVER CLEVELAND'S POLICY TOWARDS HAWAII IN 1893

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LIMITED MORALITY: GROVER CLEVELAND'S
POLICY TOWARDS HAWAII IN 1893

By

Sean Steele Kelleher

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Master of Arts

In

International Politics

Date

2011

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

LIMITED MORALITY: GROVER CLEVELAND'S
POLICY TOWARDS HAWAII IN 1893

BY

Sean Steele Kelleher

ABSTRACT

At the beginning of 1893, a small group of white property-holders overthrew the legitimate monarch of Hawaii with American support and established a Provisional Government. At the end of the year, the revolutionaries remained in power, and had every prospect of maintaining permanent control of the archipelago. In the intervening period, President Grover Cleveland sought to reverse the results of the revolution by restoring the monarch, Queen Liliuokalani, to her throne. His efforts proved futile, and he dropped the matter in December.

This paper analyzes Cleveland’s policy by applying the operational code theory. The theory seeks to explain the conduct of leaders by describing their key political beliefs, and linking those beliefs to their decision-making processes. The analysis reveals that while Cleveland detested the Provisional Government, it fit within his overarching, positive view of other states; consequently, he did not see the need to depart from his strong preference for cooperative strategy and tactics when dealing with the new regime.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT​ii

LIST OF TABLES​iv

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION​1

2. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE​12

Part 1: 1875 to 1889​12

Part 2: 1889 to 1893​21

Part 3: January and February 1893​41

Part 4: March through December 1893​56

3. CLEVELAND’S OPERATIONAL CODE​74

4. APPLYING THE CODE TO CLEVELAND’S HAWAII POLICY​85

5. CONCLUSION​89

APPENDIX: THE VICS INDICES​91

BIBLIOGRAPHY​93

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LIST OF TABLES

Table

1. ​Results of VICS Analysis – Philosophical Beliefs​78

2. ​Results of VICS Analysis – Instrumental Beliefs​79

3. ​P-1 Quadrants​79

4. ​P-2 Quadrants​80

5. ​I-1 Quadrants​81

6. ​I-2 Quadrants​82

7. ​I-5 Indices​83

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In 1893, the United States had the opportunity to annex Hawaii. A small group of whites had overthrown the native monarchy with the approval of the U.S. minister posted to the islands, and with the support of the U.S. naval contingent deployed to Honolulu. The rebels formed a Provisional Government, and immediately dispatched representatives to Washington to negotiate a treaty of annexation. Although Washington had not explicitly authorized the actions of its agents, they were consistent with the foreign policy of Benjamin Harrison's administration. Had Harrison remained in power, he would have urged the Senate to ratify the treaty of annexation which he submitted to them during his last month in office.However, in March 1893, Harrison left the White House, and Grover Cleveland entered. Cleveland had different ideas about foreign policy than his predecessor, and he chose to first withdraw the annexation treaty from the Senate's consideration, and later to forego the opportunity for territorial aggrandizement.

Like Harrison, Cleveland appreciated Hawaii's strategic value. Centrally located on the trade routes to Asia, and possessing a wonderful harbor, it could serve as a splendid base for promoting America's interests in the Pacific. To be sure, Washington exercised significant influence in Honolulu even prior to the Revolution, but by formally incorporating the archipelago into the Union it would have put that influence on a more

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secure footing, and deterred any other powers from seeking a predominant position in the islands. Nevertheless, Cleveland decided against annexation.

Remarkably, the president did more than forego an easy gain; he undertook a diplomatic initiative to reverse the results of the Revolution by seeking to restore the deposed native monarch, Queen Liliuokalani to her throne. This initiative had distinct limits; though appalled at the circumstances of the Revolution, and willing to try to remedy a great wrong, he never seriously contemplated using force to restore the ex-Queen. Ultimately, the president did not achieve his objective, and the Provisional Government maintained control of Hawaii, although it not win annexation during Cleveland's presidency.

These events present three puzzles. First, why did Cleveland withdraw the annexation treaty from the Senate in March? Second, why did he make an effort to restore the ex-Queen? And third, why did he choose to not use force to restore the ex-Queen when his diplomatic efforts failed? If Cleveland had chosen to continue Harrison's policy, and pushed the Senate to annex Hawaii in March, his policy would have been explainable in terms of America's strategic interests. If he had chosen to forcefully remove the rebels from power, and restore Liliuokalani to her throne, it would have been explainable as a triumph of idealism over realism. Instead, the president chose a middle course; he sought justice, but only if it could be obtained peacefully, and hence cheaply. The primary goal of this paper is to explain the half-way-house character of Cleveland's policy using a political science theory called the operational code.

Historians of this topic have offered a plethora of explanations for Cleveland's conduct. In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, William Appleman Williams provides an interpretation of U.S. foreign policy from the 1890s through the Vietnam War; he contends that the desire to open foreign markets to U.S. goods drove policy-making during this period. He argues that policy-makers believed that the United States' economic prosperity, and hence its domestic stability, depended on its ability to export agricultural and industrial goods that were not soaked up by the domestic market. For Williams, Cleveland's Hawaiian policy was consistent with this trend; the key point is that the president ultimately allowed the Provisional Government to maintain control of the islands.

Following Williams, Walter Lafeber sees two motivations for American foreign policy from 1865 to 1913: first, the desire for economic aggrandizement, chiefly by establishing markets for surplus U.S. goods; second, and less importantly, the desire to spread American religious ideas through missionaries. He argues that Cleveland chose to not annex Hawaii, and to not restore the ex-Queen, because the U.S. did not need to annex the islands in order to take advantage of their strategic position on the trade route to Asia. The fact that the islands were controlled by U.S. sugar growers, combined with the presence of the U.S. navy at Honolulu, ensured the security of American economic interests. Consequently, Washington did not need to incur the cost of incorporating a large group of non-whites into the Union.

Based on evidence from archives, private papers, newspapers, and journals these historians present a persuasive case that American leaders believed that their country's economic prosperity depended on overseas expansion. Unfortunately, their analysis of leaders’ perceptions is not matched by a thorough assessment of whether those perceptions corresponded to reality. Thomas McCormick raises this point. Although his interpretation of events closely follows Williams and Lafeber, he suggests that the promise of the China Market did not match the economic reality. Richard Welch, Robert Beisner and Thomas Osborne also contest the economic interpretation of foreign affairs in this period; they recognize that economic interests played an important role in the construction of U.S. policy, but think that other factors, like changes in the institution of the presidency, political ideology, and the idiosyncratic views of presidents are also crucial for explaining the course of events.

The economic interpretation of American policy does not fit the facts of 1893. Had Cleveland simply wanted to secure the strategic benefits of controlling Hawaii, he could have urged the Senate to annex the archipelago in March, or withdrawn the treaty from the Senate, and then let the matter drop, either tacitly or explicitly recognizing the Provisional Government's legitimacy. Instead, he opposed annexation, and made a diplomatic effort to restore Liliuokalani. This effort, founded on the president's outrage at the circumstances of the Revolution, shows that his policy had an important moral dimension. Certainly, Cleveland appreciated Hawaii's strategic importance, and he wanted America to have a paramount position in the islands, but these factors did not decisively affect his decision-making.

In contrast to this economic interpretation of America's relations with Hawaii, several historians have focused on Cleveland's personality, and the specific context of 1893, to explain his policy. In his history of American foreign relations in the late nineteenth century, Charles Campbell adopts an economic interpretation of events similar to the one offered by Williams' and his successors.However, on the Hawaii question, he argues that the president wanted to act in a moral manner, probably by restoring the ex-Queen, but could not find a policy that would achieve that objective; consequently, Cleveland washed his hands of the matter, and handed the issue to Congress. While Campbell does not provide much detail about why the president could not find an adequate policy, he points out that Cleveland's battle to repeal part of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act reduced his popularity in the fall of 1893; the implication is that this decline in popularity contributed to Cleveland's reluctance to use force to restore the ex-Queen. This explanation is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, the lack of detail about why the president failed to find a good policy; second, the failure to link Cleveland's reduced popularity at home to his ability to implement an effective foreign policy.

Like Campbell, Alan Nevins and Richard Welch emphasize the moral component of Cleveland's diplomacy.In his biography of the president, Nevins contends that his subject wanted to ensure that the U.S. did not incorporate Hawaii into the Union unless the majority of Hawaiians favored annexation. Once he discovered that the revolution had been perpetrated by a small minority, supported by the U.S. military, he decided that justice demanded the restoration of Liliuokalani. However, his plan depended upon the cooperation of Liliuokalani and the revolutionary government; when both sides refused to cooperate, his policy was bankrupt, and he handed the question to Congress. To explain Cleveland's decision to not use force to restore the ex-Queen, he cites unspecified domestic limitations. Nevins' emphasis on the importance of morality in Cleveland's diplomacy is appropriate, although it is exaggerated. But his analysis fails to explain why the president did not use force; "domestic limitations" is merely a phrase when no detail is provided.

In a more recent biography, Richard Welch also gives substantial weight to Cleveland's moral principles. He argues that the president favored a strong economic connection with Hawaii, but that he would not support annexation unless a majority of the Hawaiian people freely requested it. Furthermore, while he wanted to restore the ex-Queen, he insisted that she guarantee the lives and property of the rebels. The ex-Queen's refusal to grant such guarantees until late December led Cleveland to hand the question over to Congress on December 18. On the issue of why Cleveland decided against using force to achieve his object, Welch notes that the president believed that only Congress could authorize the use of force under the prevailing circumstances, and that he feared that U.S. military intervention might instigate a civil war. Like Nevins, Welch properly emphasizes the moral aspect of Cleveland's policy, but, like his predecessor, he exaggerates it. As for his two arguments about why Cleveland chose to not use force, these are drawn from a memo written by Cleveland's attorney general, Richard Olney, prior to the commencement of his diplomatic initiative in October. It is arguable that this memo influenced Cleveland's decision to not use force, however, it is also possible that Cleveland would have reached this decision regardless of Olney's advice. This paper adopts the later position, and contests the idea that Cleveland faced major external constraints when constructing his policy.

To conclude this review of the historical literature, we will discuss the three most detailed treatments of U.S.-Hawaiian Relations in this period, by Merz Tate, Sylvester Stevens, and Thomas Osborne. Interestingly, they all agree on the key points. Each historian recognizes that Cleveland had a very dim view of the Provisional Government, and that this perspective strongly influenced his decision-making. They note that he withdrew the treaty from the Senate in March because of moral concerns, and a desire to obtain an accurate picture of Hawaiian affairs. They also emphasize the importance of his key foreign policy advisors - Richard Olney, the attorney general, and Walter Gresham, the secretary of state. Gresham is portrayed as an idealist who wanted to restore the ex-Queen, perhaps even at the cost of using force. Olney is presented as a more pragmatic person, who tempered Gresham's idealism with an appreciation of the practical limits that constrained Cleveland's options; he also recognized that, despite their ill deeds, the rebels deserved to maintain their lives and property if they peacefully yielded power to the ex-Queen.All of the writers think that Olney influenced Cleveland's decision to not use force. Osborne also explains the president's decision by citing Constitutional limits on executive action. On the issue of why Cleveland handed the question to Congress at the end of 1893, Tate does not offer an answer, Stevens only notes that the ex-Queen's initial refusal of Cleveland's conditions encouraged the president to drop the matter, and Osborne writes that Cleveland's goal of restoring the ex-Queen “was absurdly impractical and could not have been realized without transforming Hawaii into a garrison state.”

The present author disagrees with their conclusions about Olney's influence. The fact that there is a close correspondence between Olney's views and the president's policy does not demonstrate that the former strongly influenced the latter. It is equally plausible that the president liked Olney's position because it reflected his own beliefs. He also disagrees with their portrayal of Olney as providing a necessary check on Gresham's idealism.Olney may have provided a check, but its necessity is not evident when one examines the context of Cleveland's decision-making in Washington and Hawaii. This issue will be explored later in the paper, when we examine the specifics of Cleveland's policy.

Having reviewed the historical literature, we will now discuss the operational code theory, which is used to analyze Cleveland's decision-making.

The operational code concept originated in two books by Nathan Leites’ that were published in the 1950s: A Study of Bolshevism, and The Operational Code of the Politburo. In 1969, Alexander George distilled many of Leites’ ideas into a series of ten philosophical and instrumental questions. The philosophical questions concern a leader’s beliefs about his political environment, and his capacity to influence it through policy-making. The instrumental questions concern a leader’s beliefs about the best means for implementing those policies. The answers to these questions constitute a leaders’ operational code:

Philosophical Questions:

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical developments? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Questions:

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

According to George, the code provides a framework for explaining political action, because it is part of the filtering system that decision-makers use to simplify complex situations in order to make them comprehensible.Therefore, the code allows us to explain how leaders interpret, and operate in, their political environment.

Since the publication of George's article, political scientists have developed a content analysis system called the Verbs in Context System to construct leaders' operational codes. The purpose of the VICS, and the methods for applying it, are described in the chapter on Cleveland's operation code. Here, it is sufficient to note that by analyzing the verbs contained in leaders' spoken and written statements, the system produces quantitative answers to George's ten questions.

Mainly by its application of the operational code theory, this paper makes three contributions to our understanding of Cleveland's Hawaiian policy. First, it provides a rigorous examination of the link between Cleveland's beliefs, and his policy, using the Verbs in Context System. Prior students of Cleveland's presidency have not used this method to analyze his decision-making.Second, the analysis reveals that the president's policies are explained by his operational code. It would have been difficult to reach this conclusion without using the VICS, because even after reading the documents from 1893, the student is left wondering why a leader who was so deeply revolted by the circumstances of the revolution, made such a limited effort to correct the injustice. Third, the historical narrative includes a distinctive assessment of the merits of Cleveland's policy, and a refutation of the claim that his options were seriously constrained by external factors.

The remainder of the paper consists of three sections.Chapter two provides a narrative of America's policy towards Hawaii from 1875 to the beginning of 1894.Chapter three presents Cleveland's operational code, and shows that it explains his policy. Chapter four contains the author's concluding thoughts.

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CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

​This chapter is divided into three parts. Part one examines U.S. – Hawaiian relations from 1875 to the end of Cleveland’s first administration in 1889. Additionally, it describes the interests that contributed to the formation of America’s foreign policy toward the archipelago in the late nineteenth century. Part two describes president Harrison’s approach to Hawaii through the end of 1892. Part three deals with the Revolution, which took place in January 1893, and the Harrison administration’s response to the upheaval. Finally, part four addresses Cleveland’s policy towards Hawaii through the beginning of 1894.

Part 1: 1875 to 1889

In 1875, the United States and the Kingdom of Hawaii signed a Reciprocity Treaty which went into effect on September 9, 1876. The treaty contained schedules of items that each party would admit free of duty. The United States’ schedule consisted principally of agricultural products, including sugar. Hawaii’s schedule consisted of an array of agricultural, industrial and other manufactured goods, reflecting the United State’s economic superiority. Under article IV, the Hawaiian Kingdom, but not the U.S., agreed to not alienate any territory while the treaty is in force, and to not extend the same

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treatment of items covered in its schedule to any other state. This article reflects the inequality of power between the U.S. and Hawaii.

​Through article IV, the Reciprocity Treaty gave America significant political influence in Hawaii. In his June 30, 1881 instructions to Minister Comly at Honolulu, Secretary of State Blaine explained that Hawaii’s government could not extend privileges granted to the United States under the treaty to other powers. To maintain the treaty’s integrity, the U.S. was willing to support the Kingdom if other countries pressured it to dispense with Article IV. Even if Hawaii’s Supreme Court ruled that abrogation of that provision was constitutional, Blaine insisted that any action implementing that ruling would abrogate the entire treaty, and compel the U.S. to take steps to secure its interests. The Secretary instructs Comly to communicate with the Kingdom in a positive tone. He should offer help and support in maintaining the treaty.

​In November, Blaine sent Comly a new set of instructions to counteract British efforts to undermine American influence in the islands. He told Comly that the negative actions of the British representative should be circumspectly countered; ideally, the Minister should not state that he is acting on behalf of the United States. If he learns that Britain and Hawaii are negotiating on matters of immigration, he should inform the Kingdom that the U.S. will not tolerate Hawaii’s domination by another great power. Rather, the U.S. strongly supports the continuance of an independent Hawaii that has friendly relations with America. Again, Blaine urged Comly to use discretion, and to directly confront the Kingdom only if it is necessary to secure American interests.

​These instructions demonstrate that America wanted more than an advantageous trading relationship with the island Kingdom. It wanted to be the predominant foreign influence in Hawaii. In his December dispatches to Comly, Blaine explained the reasons for America’s keen interest in the archipelago.

​The development of the Pacific states practically drew Hawaii into the American System. In the North Pacific, the U.S. has a “legitimately dominating influence . . . which it can never consent to see decreased by the intrusion therein of any element of influence hostile to its own.” Hawaii is the key to the North Pacific, and thus falls within the valid area of U.S. interests as much as the Central American isthmus. Consequently, the U.S. has developed close relations with the Kingdom. Crucially, the U.S. cannot permit another power to control Hawaii. On this point, he is concerned that the reduction of the native population, combined with the importation of Asiatic labor for the island’s plantations, will draw Hawaii closer to Asia than America. He suggests that if the Kingdom reaches a point when it can no longer maintain its stance of benevolent neutrality towards the U.S., annexation of the islands would be appropriate. The implication of comparing Hawaii with the isthmus, along with the discussion of the American System, is that the United States’ economic development requires its domination of the islands.

​In an accompanying dispatch, Blaine noted that an alternative to annexation would be colonization. He argued that increased emigration of U.S. labor to the islands might be sufficient to counteract the decline in the native population. The Secretary instructed Comly to investigate methods of encouraging such emigration, suggesting that a Hawaiian homestead act might be effective. This concern about the growth of Asiatic labor on the islands would be echoed by Minister Stevens in the years preceding the 1893 revolution.

​Plainly, Blaine’s position that America had a right to dominate Hawaii is fallacious. One country does not have the right to control another merely because it would like to.However, his arguments were widely accepted in America at this time. In the 1890s, the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan added a military component to Blaine’s economic arguments. Mahan argued that the U.S. should annex Hawaii for five reasons. First, it was a key geographic position on the trade route from the Central American isthmus to Asia – he assumed that a canal would be built eventually. Second, it would provide a bulwark for the United States, and other Western powers, if China launched an invasion of the West – he was concerned about increased Chinese emigration to the islands. Third, assuming an adequate fleet was based in the country, it would give the U.S. an excellent position for protecting the West Coast, and the Pacific outlet of an isthmian canal. Fourth, its possession would deprive an enemy of the only major island group, and hence coaling station, within reasonable distance of the West Coast. Fifth, annexation would be the first step towards an expansionist foreign policy that would bolster the economy, and spread American civilization abroad.

​Mahan’s arguments, and others like them, contributed to the formation of American foreign policy during this period. Furthermore, several of his arguments were valid.World War Two demonstrated Hawaii’s military significance, when it served as a vital base of operations for our Pacific offensives; also, Japan could not threaten the West Coast with invasion during that conflict, because it lacked a base for launching such an effort. His contention that Hawaii was a vital post on the trade route to Asia is also indisputable, even though the importance of Asia as a market for U.S. goods was exaggerated in this era. These realities influenced policy-making in Cleveland’s first administration.

​U.S. - Hawaiian relation were uneventful between 1881 and 1887. In May 1882, Secretary of State Frelinghuysen instructed Minister Comly to protest any movement by the Kingdom to excessively tax foreign wealth. He noted that under the Reciprocity Treaty, the U.S. expected the two countries to tax foreign wealth at similar rates. Later that year, the U.S. prepared for the February 1883 coronation of King Kalakaua by deploying two warships to Honolulu to protect American interests from any possible public disorder. After the coronation, Minister Dagget requested the permanent presence of a warship at Honolulu to protect U.S. interests. Frelinghuysen informed him that the navy would be unable to fulfill this request, but that it would arrange to have ships visit the islands as frequently as possible. These routine matters illustrate two points: first, the U.S. stretched the Reciprocity Treaty' meaning to promote its economic interests; second, well before the 1893 revolution, U.S. ministers to Hawaii relied on naval support.

​U.S. – Hawaiian relations became more interesting in during Cleveland’s first administration. On January 8, 1887 Secretary of State Bayard sent instructions to Minister Merrill at Honolulu concerning the negotiation of a loan between the Kingdom and Great Britain. Bayard worried that, contrary to the spirit of the Reciprocity Treaty, Hawaii might pledge its revenues as collateral for the loan. He instructed Merrill to inform King Kalakaua of the United States’ deep interest in Hawaii’s autonomy, and to express his satisfaction that the British loan did not use government revenues as collateral. On November 9, 1887 the two signatories agreed to extend the Reciprocity Treaty for seven years. Additionally, they expanded the scope of the treaty, giving the United States exclusive access to Pearl Harbor, and the right to build a coaling and repair base to support U.S. ships.

​These actions demonstrate Cleveland's insistence on maintaining America’s paramount position in Hawaii.Bayard objected to Hawaii pledging its revenues as collateral, because that action would give Britain undue influence over the Kingdom’s finances. Additionally, the extension and expansion of the Reciprocity Treaty bolstered America’s preponderance in the islands.Furthermore, the expansion of the Reciprocity Treaty enhanced the commercial and military value of the islands for the United States. Cleveland’s actions reflected his belief that the islands were a crucial station for U.S. merchants pursuing commercial opportunities in the Pacific.

​In the middle of 1887, Hawaii suffered a political revolution. The Reform Party, consisting of whites who represented the islands' landed interests, used the threat of force to compel King Kalakaua to change the constitution.Some of its members were born in the islands, others had immigrated to them. A detailed examination of this revolution is unnecessary for our purposes, but its consequence, the constitution of 1887, will be examined in some detail, because it contributed to the outbreak of the 1893 revolution.

Its key provisions are listed below:

Article 15: Legislature must authorize taxing and spending except in emergencies, and when it is out of session; during emergencies, concurrence of the whole cabinet and a majority of the privy council is required for financial decisions.

Article 24: The King and his successors must swear an oath “to maintain the constitution of the Kingdom whole and inviolate, and to govern in conformity therewith.”

​Article 26: Military action must be authorized by legislature.

Article 31: King’s cabinet holds executive power, King must sign laws for them to be valid.

Article 41: King appoints cabinet, but can dismiss cabinet members only if a majority of the Legislature votes that they lack confidence in the minister, or if he is convicted of a felony. Ministers are subject to impeachment. All actions of King must be countersigned by a cabinet member.

Article 47: Legislature authorized to amend constitution and to pass laws consistent with it (see Article 82).

​Article 48: King’s veto can be overturned by two thirds vote of the legislature.

​Article 58: Twenty four nobles to be elected to legislature.

Article 59: Male residents of American, European or native descent can vote for nobles subject to a variety of restrictions (most importantly a property restriction). Asians wholly excluded from this franchise.

​Article 60: There will be 24 “representatives of the people” in the legislature.

Article 62: Males of American, European or native descent, subject to restrictions, may vote for one representative at an election.

Article 78: Unless otherwise stated, all of the sovereign’s actions must be done “with the advice and consent of the cabinet”

Article 82: Constitution can only be amended if the amendment is approved by a two thirds vote of consecutive legislatures.

Viewed independently, this was a liberal document for the nineteenth century. But viewed relative to the constitutional arrangements which it replaced, it was a reactionary document, designed to enhance the power of the white minority on the islands.

In his report to President Cleveland on the 1893 revolution, James H. Blount discussed the changes wrought by the 1887 constitution. First, the monarch no longer appointed nobles to the legislature, they would be elected by a property qualified franchise. Under the new regime, whites controlled 3/4 of the votes for nobles, leaving the Natives with 1/4 of them. Second, large numbers of resident foreigners, who were not citizens of Hawaii, could vote under the new constitution if they did so in the first election after its promulgation - many of these votes, particularly those of thousands of Portuguese laborers, were dictated by white property holders. Through this change, the Reform Party diluted the influence of the Natives in elections of representatives to the legislature. Third, the number of nobles and representative is equalized, so by controlling the franchise for nobles, whites/foreigners had a check on the 24 representatives elected by a broader franchise. By electing a single favorable representative, whites/foreigners could control the legislature. Fourth, monarchs appointed, but could not remove their cabinets; the legislature possessed the power of removal. Fifth, the monarch’s actions had to be countersigned by a member of the cabinet "who by that signature makes himself responsible." Overall, the 1887 constitution diluted the power of the monarch, increased the power of whites/foreigners, and reduced the power of the Natives.

These changes did not bother Cleveland. Hawaiian politics did not concern him as long as U.S. interests were preserved. In his July 12 instructions to Merrill, Bayard described the administration’s view of Hawaii. The central U.S. interest was to protect American lives and property, and to maintain the smooth flow of commerce between the two countries. He instructed Merrill to uphold these interests, even if he had to deploy troops from U.S. warships at Honolulu. But as long as those interests were preserved, he should not interfere in Hawaii’s domestic affairs. Bayard emphasized that Hawaii fell within the U.S. sphere of influence because of its geographic proximity to, and close economic links with, America. In the following March, Bayard again wrote to Merrill, expressing the administration's satisfaction with the constitutional changes, and the fact that they occurred without foreign interference.

​In 1889, President Benjamin Harrison entered the White House; the events of his administration will be described in the next chapter.

Part 2: 1889 to 1893

​Before delving into the diplomacy of Harrison’s administration, a few statistics will be offered to provide background about the social and economic structure of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and its economic relationship with the United States. These figures are taken from contemporary Hawaiian government sources.

Population

1892 est.: 96,075

1890: Natives = 34,436, Half Castes (foreigners with some native blood) = 6,186, Foreigners born in Hawaii = 7,495, American = 1,928, British = 1,344, German = 1,034, French = 70, Portuguese = 8,602, Norwegian = 227, Chinese = 15,301, Japanese = 12,360, Polynesian = 588, Others = 419

Registered Voters

1890: Natives = 8,777, Half Castes = 777, Foreigners Born in Hawaii = 146, All other Foreigners = 3,893 [Note: Chinese and Japanese residents excluded from franchise]

Property Values

1890 Assessments: Real = $18,343,958, Personal = $17,000,240, Total = $35,344,198.

1892 Value of Sugar Estates: Total = est. $32,347,690, American Owned = est. $24,735,610 (74.17%), Hawaiian Owned = est. $266,250 (.8%), British and German Owned = all but est. $299,100 of remainder.

Exports/ Imports from U.S.

Exports ($):

​1882​​1883​​1884​​1885​​1886​​

Sugar:​-​ ​-​​-​​8,356,061​9,775,132​

Total:​6,885,437​7,924,727​7,977,909​9,158,818​10,565,886

To U.S. : -​​- ​​-​​8,933,206​10,412,827​

​

1887​​1888​​1889​​1890​​1891

Sugar:​8,694,964​10,818,883​13,089,302​12,159,285​9,550,438

Total:​9,435,204​11,631,465​13,810,071​13,023,304​10,244,325

To U.S.: -​​-​​13,840,523​13,073,477​10,196,278

​

​Imports from U.S.: 1884 = 2,835,127, 1891 = 6,495,608

These statistics illustrate five key points. First, given that Chinese and Japanese residents could not vote, if the property qualifications for voting had been eliminated, Native Hawaiians would have had the largest share of the franchise. Second, a comparison of the 1890 property assessment figures with the 1892 values of sugar estates, demonstrates that sugar growing dominated Hawaii’s economy. Furthermore, Hawaii earned its highest export profits from sugar, the bulk of which went to America, the Kingdom’s dominant export market. Third, sugar exports became progressively more lucrative during the 1880s. Fourth, foreigners – Americans, Britains, and Germans – had almost total control of Hawaii’s sugar plantations, and hence of its economy. Fifth, the Kingdom’s economy was closely linked to America’s; from an economic standpoint, it was part of the American System described by Secretary Blaine. With this statistical background in mind, we will return to the diplomatic narrative.

On May 18, 1889 Minister Merrill at Honolulu reported to Washington that Britain intended to deploy a warship in Hawaiian waters permanently. Perhaps motivated by the same concerns as his British colleagues, he requested the permanent presence of a U.S. warship at Honolulu to prevent any instability, and protect American interests. The U.S.S. Adams began its voyage to the islands later that month.

Merrill’s concern for political stability on the islands proved prescient. In late July, he reported that, according to rumors, a group of half castes were planning an uprising against the King. In response, Merrill asked the commander of the Adams to delay a planned trip to Samoa, until the British warship in the area returned to Honolulu. The ship’s commander complied with this request. On July 30, the rumored revolt materialized. Two half castes, Robert Wilcox and Robert Boyd, led about one hundred half castes and natives in an uprising against the King. The rebels occupied the palace grounds and the Government Building in Honolulu. Government forces surrounded the rebel positions, breaking them up with fire from sharp shooters deployed on adjacent roofs. When the fighting erupted, Merrill requested the Adam’s commander to deploy marines to the U.S. legation. The commander complied with this request; later in the day, with the ascent of the King's cabinet, the rest of the ship’s marines landed to help maintain order. Although the deployment of U.S. forces helped to stabilize the situation, the government forces suppressed the revolt by themselves. Merrill concluded his dispatch on the matter by noting that the affair would probably increase the government’s popularity. Not surprisingly, Washington approved of its minister’s actions.

​ The insurgents likely had a different view of the matter. Technically, they had been crushed by government forces, but by eliminating any possibility that the revolt would spread beyond the confines of the palace and the Government Building, the landing of the marinesdemonstrated that the U.S. supported the government. If the marines had been deployed solely to protect the U.S. legation then the landing would have been a neutral action, designed to provide security for an endangered diplomatic post; however, its broader character, aimed at stabilizing affairs in Honolulu, shows that the U.S. preferred the status quo over instability, and hence the government over the insurgents. Merrill’s report does not reveal the motivations of the insurgents, so it is not known whether they planned to instigate a general uprising of natives and half castes against the government, but it is reasonable to speculate that they hoped for such an outcome. In any case, the landing demonstrated the United States' willingness to use force to protect its interests on the islands; it also showed that the U.S. supported the Reform Party, which represented white property holders.

​ Whatever pleasure King Kalakaua derived from suppressing the revolt was dispersed a few days later when his cabinet, composed of Reform Party members, launched a fresh assault on monarchical authority. As reported in the August 5 edition of the Advertiser, a Honolulu daily newspaper, the King’s cabinet made the following demand: “Your Majesty shall in future sign all documents and do all acts which, under the laws or the constitution, require the signature or act of the Sovereign, when advised so to do by the cabinet, the cabinet being solely and absolutely responsible for any signature of any document or act so done or performed by their advice.” The King resisted this demand initially, but he acquiesced when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the cabinet. The court ruled that the constitution placed responsibility with the cabinet, not the King. Consequently, the cabinet was the governing authority. The opinion eviscerated the King’s power, turning a constitutional monarchy into a constitutional oligarchy.

​Political affairs in Hawaii stabilized after the turbulent events of mid-Summer. A number of the July 30^th rebels were arrested, and their trials were scheduled for October.In early September, Merrill reviewed the causes of the July 30^th uprising. First, the natives had an unfounded belief that the foreign residents, and the cabinet, were jointly planning to destroy the Kingdom’s autonomy. The publication of letters in the United States, advising American interference in the islands’ affairs, supported this belief. Some of these letters had been reproduced in Hawaiian papers. Second, the natives wanted to obtain a larger share of government patronage, and to change the composition of the cabinet.Third, the insurgents believed that their actions were legitimate because they were following the precedent of 1887, when the Reform Party had used the threat of force to change the constitution. Like their predecessors, they wanted to change the constitution and the government forcefully, but non-violently. Unfortunately for them, the rebels forgot that the Reform Party had triumphed in 1887 because it had superior force.

​At the end of September, Merrill left Hawaii. His replacement, Minister Stevens, played a decisive role in future events. Stevens’ opinions about island affairs are exhibited in an early dispatch. He reported strong pro U.S. feeling among the “best portion of the population, [particularly] among the men of business and property”; and he argues that their trade relationship is drawing the two countries closer together. He included an article from the Commercial Advertiser, a Honolulu daily newspaper, describing efforts by the Hawaiian government to negotiate for a new reciprocity treaty, in order to forge closer economic and political links with America.

After noting that the Kingdom’s exports had increased from $2,241,041 in 1876, to $11,707,598 in 1888, the cabinet stated that the move to negotiate was triggered by its desire to put the Reciprocity Treaty on a permanent footing, in order to establish commercial stability, and to create an atmosphere favorable to long term investments. It also feared that opposition to reciprocity in America might jeopardize the two counties economic relations. The government particularly wanted to expand Hawaii’s access to the U.S. market, in order to increase the number of goods that the Kingdom could profitably produce, and to ensure that Hawaiian sugar was treated the same as sugar produced in America. Beyond these economic concerns, the cabinet appreciated the Kingdom's lack of strength relative to the great powers, and it wanted a strong ally to protect their country from foreign encroachment. To achieve this object, it sought a U.S. guarantee of Hawaiian independence. Overall, the Reform Party and its supporters looked to the United States for economic prosperity and security.

​In addition to managing the Kingdom's external relations, the government had to deal with the internal problem of disgruntled natives. In October, the courts convicted several July 30 rebels, although Wilcox was acquitted. Many of the natives sympathized with the rebels, and were not pleased by these convictions. They wanted to revise the 1887 constitution, in order to restore the king to a position of primacy in the government, and to enhance their own political power. In early November, Stevens worried that Wilcox’s acquittal portended more unrest. He also reported that the best people in Hawaii strongly supported the current government, and would be distressed to see it turned out of office in the upcoming elections. Rear Admiral Kimberly, the naval commander at Honolulu, shared Stevens' concerns, noting that despite the peacefulness of the current political climate, racial divisions persisted. The natives disliked the 1887 constitution, thinking that it restricted their rights, and the King’s, in favor of the whites. The admiral advised that a warship should be deployed to Honolulu during the elections scheduled for February 1890. Washington listened to its representatives, issuing orders for the requested deployment.

​Contrary to their forebodings, the February 1890 elections occurred peacefully, and produced a positive result for the Reform Party, which obtained a small majority in the Legislature. This result favored U.S. interests on the islands, and the majority of property holders welcomed it. Stevens noted that the King, along with his “dependents and parasites and chief elements of corruption in the Kingdom,” opposed the current Reform cabinet, and had hoped that the opposition would triumph.His dispatch on this subject includes newspaper accounts of the campaigns. According to these articles, the Reform Party blamed its opponents for inciting racial tensions among the natives; the party also argued that it had the best chance of building closer ties with the U.S.

​Despite these attractive election results, Stevens continued worrying about the future. His concerns are presented in a March dispatch that is full of urgency.Although Americans, and residents with American parents, controlled at least half of the country’s property, they did not have an economic or political monopoly. Washington needed to take active measures to maintain its position on the islands by combating anti U.S. “influences.” He recommended two measures to achieve that objective: first, financing a cable from San Francisco to Honolulu; second, improving the facilities at Pearl Harbor. He provided three reasons for these recommendations: first, to aid U.S. commerce; second, to demonstrate the United States' intent on the islands to foreign powers; third, to increase America’s stake in Hawaii, and thus encourage American emigration to the archipelago. Like Blaine, Stevens feared the growth of “Asiatic and other influences adverse to Christian civilization.” Consequently, he strongly advocated for increased U.S. emigration to the islands to counter the yellow peril. For him, Hawaii was embroiled in a struggle between American and Asiatic civilization, and he wanted the former to triumph. This dispatch was quite similar to Blaine’s earlier description of Hawaii’s significance, showing that Stevens’ conception of the issue was shared by the Harrison administration.

​Stevens did not call for annexation in this letter. But in light of the minister's view of American-Hawaiian relations, President Harrison could not have been surprised when Stevens facilitated the Reform Party’s revolt in 1893.Additionally, given Hawaii’s recent history of political turbulence, Harrison must have appreciated the possibility that another revolt would occur. Thus, by keeping Stevens at his post, Harrison tacitly consented to the use of U.S. force to support an uprising by the Reform Party.Consequently, in 1893, Stevens’ acted as conscientious government official.

​Returning to the events of 1890, the new legislature held its first session in May. After several members switched to the opposition, the country faced a period of political uncertainty. Stevens, naturally, anticipated the worst. But when the legislature selected a new cabinet, it consisted of two Reform Party members, and two opposition members who were partial to the natives and supported the King. Although he thought that the ministry was less impressive than its predecessor, Stevens expected that it would have good relations with the U.S. Meanwhile, prior to the change of ministry, the King and his cabinet engaged in another legal scuffle. Acting on the attorney generals advice, the King declared that each cabinet member could veto the actions of any other cabinet member; the other cabinet members, and the Supreme Court, opposed this declaration. Presumably, the King thought he could bolster his influence over government policy-making by giving himself the ability to block cabinet action via a single minister.

This incident may have whetted Kalakaua’s appetite for legal innovation, because in August he considered calling a convention to reform the 1887 constitution, with the goal of restoring much of his lost power. Stevens asserted that petitions from “a popular delegation, composed mainly of the less intelligent natives, led chiefly by unscrupulous demagogues” prompted the King's deliberations. He also suggested that the King and his supporters instigated the issue, and that they had financial backing from a source in London. Whatever the truth of these statements, the minister accurately argued that the proposal would violate the amendment provisions of the constitution. While clearly worried that the natives might revolt again, as shown by his request for the permanent deployment of a warship to Honolulu, he thought that the majority of the cabinet, and a narrow legislative majority, would oppose the idea of a constitutional convention. To help the cause, Stevens, along with Britain’s minister, advised the King against calling a convention.

Faced with opposition from the legislature, and the "responsible citizens" on the islands, the King reversed his position in September. At the end of the legislative session in November, Stevens reviewed its activities. The Reform Party had controlled the tenor of the session, despite its minority status, by cooperating with conservative members of the opposition. It rejected the plan for a constitutional convention. It passed a bill allowing Chinese laborers to enter the country on contracts, and requiring their departure when the contracts expired. It appropriated funds to improve internal communications, and to facilitate commerce with other states. Finally, in response to the McKinley Tariff, it encouraged the cabinet to negotiate for an expanded reciprocity treaty.

The McKinley Tariff eliminated Hawaii’s privileged position in America’s sugar market. Under the original terms of the Reciprocity Treaty, the country's planters could export their sugar to the U.S. free of duty. Now, they had to pay the same tariff as other foreign sugar growers. This change threatened the profits of the Kingdom’s sugar planters, and it was an important cause of the 1893 revolution; many sugar planters wanted the U.S. to annex Hawaii, so that the islands would become part of America’s domestic economy, allowing them to sell to U.S. customers free of duty. In his report on the 1893 revolution, Blount wrote that for the sugar planters, who were the most influential group among the whites, “annexation has for its charm the complete abolition of all duties on their exports to the United States.” The sugar planters also favored annexation because they supported the development of Pearl Harbor, and the construction of a cable from California to Hawaii. However, the planters recognized that U.S. laws against the importation of contract labor could devastate them, because they depended on an abundant supply of contract laborers to grow their product at a competitive cost. They generally expected that, if annexed, Hawaii would be exempted from these laws.

At the beginning of 1891, King Kalakaua died. The Princess Liliuokalani succeeded him; the transition occurred smoothly; and politics quickly returned to their normal state. In a February 22^nd dispatch, Stevens stated that the Queen was surrounded by bad elements in society, and that she wanted to replace her current ministry with a new cabinet composed of her supporters. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court ruled that because King Kalakaua’s cabinet ceased to be a legal entity when he died, the Queen could appoint a new cabinet. Although disheartened by this decision, Stevens was pleasantly surprised when the Queen appointed a cabinet which was favorably disposed towards the United States.

The remainder of 1891 passed quietly. Later in the year, competing groups sought to gain the Queen’s support, and prepared for the next round of elections in February 1892. The placidity of affairs is demonstrated by Stevens' statement that the presence of a U.S. warship would probably not be necessary until the beginning of December.At that point, a ship would be required through the end of 1892 to ensure order, and to provide evidence of America’s special interest in the islands. Despite these happy circumstances, Stevens worried about the future. In a September dispatch, he noted that the McKinley Tariff had seriously injured the economic position of the sugar planters. He favored a revision of the reciprocity treaty to include a broader array of Hawaiian goods, in order to provide businessmen with an incentive to travel to, and remain in, the islands. He viewed businessmen as a strong pro-American force on the islands, and to draw them to Hawaii, he desired greater integration of the two country's economies. He was also concerned that if the United States did not deepen its relations with the Kingdom, preferably via annexation, a European power might seize the islands.To round out the diplomatic correspondence for the year, Stevens requested the deployment of a warship to the Kingdom in early October; Washington complied with his request later that month.

With the legislative elections of February 1892, we enter the period antecedent to the 1893 revolution. In his report on the elections, Stevens began by listing the key issues in the campaigns. For business, conservatives, and responsible men the central issue was treaty relations with the United States. For the opposition – the usual combination of “irresponsible” white voters, half-castes, and natives – the central issues were the desire for a new constitution, opposition to the current cabinet and, to a lesser extent, opposition to the current reciprocity treaty.The groups favoring an expanded reciprocity treaty obtained a “decisive majority.” However, the minister still anticipated a prolonged period of political uncertainty on the islands, and requested the permanent deployment of a U.S. warship to the area; he noted that Britain planned to keep a warship at Honolulu indefinitely. On the bright side, the minister reported that pro-annexation sentiment was increasing on the islands.

On March 8, Stevens requested instructions from Blaine. He wanted to know how he should act in case of an uprising against the Queen. While noting the general rule that U.S. forces should only be used to protect U.S. legations, along with the lives and property of U.S. citizens, he stated that America’s unique relationship with Hawaii, combined with the exceptional actions of American officials in the past (remember Merrill), indicated that a different rule might be appropriate in this case. After making this request, he provided the first hint of a conspiracy against the Queen, whose members aimed to overthrow her, establish a republic, and seek annexation to the United States. The minister thought that the conspirators would have already struck if there had not been a U.S. warship at Honolulu. He believed that the permanent presence of a warship would prevent a revolt, but he requested instructions because of his uncertainty on this point. Regardless of whether this information was accurate, the fact that he included it in the dispatch is highly significant. Not only did he ask for instructions, he explained that he needed a quick answer, because a revolution could occur at any moment.

Shockingly, the minister never received a response from Blaine, or from his successor, Secretary Foster.Consequently, when revolution came to Hawaii in 1893, the person controlling the most formidable military force in the Kingdom, Minister Stevens, had no instructions from his government to guide his actions. However, what is shocking to the student of this period was probably welcomed by Stevens – he was left to follow his heart. At any rate, he did not pester the State Department about its failure to reply to his request; the matter was dropped in Honolulu and Washington.

While it is tempting to explain this episode by invoking the phrase “plausible deniability,” it is doubtful that Harrison thought he would have to deny anything.Anyone with access to the State Department’s records would already have had a clear conception of Harrison’s Hawaiian policy before reading Stevens’ dispatch, and the non-response to that letter was perfectly consistent with that policy. Furthermore, the failure to respond to such a dispatch is damning enough. Still, it is just possible that while the president had no qualms about his policy, he did not want to create an official document that instructed a U.S. minister to violently overthrow a legitimate government.

At this point in our narrative, Stevens’ dispatches become less useful for the student. He expatiates on the Queen’s corruption, her love affair with the police commander, Marshall Wilson, and his unfortunate influence over her. On top of this, there are malicious lottery and opium rings influencing government policy.Even if the Queen’s government was a hot house of corruption, the rebels of 1893 had no illusions about the popularity of their endeavor. They knew that they aimed to establish an oligarchy, and that they needed Stevens’ support to succeed. Two pieces of evidence support this claim. First, on January 16, 1893, the day before the rebels overthrew the Queen and proclaimed a Provisional Government, they wrote a letter to Stevens which admitted their inability to defend themselves, and requested protection by U.S. forces against the Queen's tyranny.Second, on March 16, 1893 L.A. Thurston, a leader of the Provisional Government, wrote a letter to a member of the opposition in which he admitted that the Provisional Government was an autocracy. Of course, popularity is not the sole criterion for legitimacy, so if the Queen's government was particularly vile, perhaps the revolution would have been justified. The evidence on this point is mixed; in the mass of papers included in Blount's report, one finds statements supporting both viewpoints. However, two points are clear: first, Stevens detested the Queen and her government; second, the 1893 revolution was not a democratic movement. In the remainder of this narrative, Stevens' personal views of the Queen will be excluded.

In April, Stevens reported that pro-annexation sentiment was increasing among the general population, and that anti-Queen sentiment was increasing among the native population due to revulsion at government corruption. Two reasons explained why a revolt had not yet broken out: first, the Queen's opponents had not decided on the best approach for achieving political change; second, the presence of a U.S. warship fostered stability. Although no major agitations occurred prior to the opening of the next legislative session in late May, the government arrested a number of people on accusations of treason.According to Stevens, it made the arrests to curry favor with the legislature, by targeting people who were strongly disliked by members of that body. In particular, he believed that the Queen wanted to ensure that the legislature did not vote out her cabinet, which she had appointed after King Kalakaua's death. He concluded his dispatch by emphasizing the continued need for a U.S. warship at Honolulu, although he stated that the “best and most responsible” men sought change through legislative action.

At the opening session of the legislature on May 28, the Queen encouraged the legislature to take action on several fronts: first, to develop Hawaiian agriculture and industry; second, to deal with the repercussions of the McKinley Tariff; third, to reduce public expenditure while providing for internal improvements: and fourth, to encourage the construction of a cable between San Francisco and Honolulu. Sadly, an intractable conflict over the composition of the Queen's cabinet disrupted this promising agenda.

In his report to Cleveland, Blount summarized this political imbroglio. The 1892 election had produced a legislature divided between the Reform, National Reform, and Liberal parties. The Reform Party lacked a majority in the legislature, but by combining with the other parties at different points, it succeeded in voting out objectionable cabinets until one led by minister Wilcox was appointed in November 1892. This cabinet consisted entirely of Reform Party members. In January 1893, a combination of the National Reform and Liberal parties voted out the Wilcox cabinet.

In his reports covering this period, Stevens argued that, absent the presence of U.S. forces at Honolulu, the Queen would probably have dissolved the legislature, appointed a new cabinet, and promulgated a new constitution aligned with her interests. At the same time, Admiral Brown, head of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Station, reported that there was substantial support among Americans, Germans and natives for a change in government leading to annexation by the United States. He stated that an organization of the leading annexationists was planning to replace the monarchy with a republic; it hoped that the Queen would peacefully abdicate in exchange for a cash settlement; and it wanted to achieve its goals non-violently, depending on the support of a majority of Hawaiians. The credibility of this information is not relevant for our purposes. The key point is that Washington had been warned that Hawaii might descend into chaos, but still did not send instructions to its representatives.

Before describing the 1893 revolution in the next chapter, we will review a November 20 memorandum that Stevens sent to Secretary Foster, who replaced Blaine earlier in the year. It discussed Hawaii's importance, and the policy that America should pursue towards the Kingdom. The first part of the memo noted that Hawaii's harbors, especially Pearl Harbor, were large, deep and highly defensible, making them excellent bases for warfare and commerce. Furthermore, since their prosperity largely hinged on a prosperous Pacific commerce, the Western states needed the U.S. to have a firm grip on the islands.Consequently, he favored the construction of a cable between San Francisco and Honolulu, and a coaling station at Pearl Harbor.

To add urgency to his recommendations for decisive action, he emphasized two threats to America's position.First, Britain might seize the islands. Second, by reducing the revenues of sugar planters, the McKinley Tariff encouraged them to import more labor from Asia to reduce the cost of production. Combined with a declining native population, this increased immigration meant that Hawaii would be asiaticized unless the U.S. annexed it, ruled it in a Western style, and laid the foundation for a Western economic system based on American and European small farmers.

Based on these points, Stevens presented two policy options: annexation would be ideal, but a viable alternative would be a customs union linked to an implied or explicit U.S. protectorate over the islands. He concluded the memorandum with his standard refrain that pro-annexation sentiment was increasing.

Considering his perspective on Hawaiian affairs, it is not surprising that he supported a revolutionary party seeking annexation to the United States.

Part 3: January and February 1893

​On January 17, 1893 a small group of rebels proclaimed the existence of a Provisional Government on the steps of the Government Building. Minister Stevens rapidly recognized the new regime, and Queen Liliuokalani bowed to the inevitable. The new leaders immediately sent a delegation to Washington seeking annexation. On February 14, the two governments signed a treaty to achieve that objective. Thus, in less than a month, the rebels had formed a new government, and almost achieved their long coveted goal of joining the United States.Unfortunately for them, the Senate had to ratify the treaty, and Cleveland succeeded in delaying ratification until he entered office. Once ensconced in the White House, he withdrew the treaty from the Senate, and sent James Blount to investigate the circumstances of the Revolution.

The following account of the Revolution is based on Blount's report, because it formed the factual foundation of Cleveland's policy later in the year, and because its authoritativeness has been recognized by the leading historians of U.S. - Hawaiian relations during this period.The total report amounts to hundreds of pages of documents and testimony that Blount accumulated in the course of his investigation. He took care to seek information from across the political spectrum, and his objectivity in this matter explains the enduring reputation of his work. Thankfully, he summarized his findings in a thirty eight page report dealing with the origin, course and aftermath of the Revolution.

Blount's Report

Economic Background of the Revolution

After the creation of the Reciprocity Treaty, and prior to the McKinley Tariff, sugar planters earned $5 million a year from not having to pay duty on exports to the United States. During the same period, the Kingdom spent $1,026,212 to help sugar planters import labor; the planters themselves spent $565,547. The monarchy arranged with other countries – particularly Japan, China, and Portugal - for the importation of labor on contracts. The laborers earned low wages, and threats of fines and imprisonment compelled them to work diligently for their employers until their contracts expired. The abundance of contract labor, combined with the government's willingness to enforce the contracts, caused the cost of labor to fall, and the value of property to rise.

Political Background of the Revolution

Generally, foreigners controlled economic and political affairs on the islands. Their principal desires - to prevent the natives from exercising a level of political influence commensurate with their numbers – were the central sources of political conflict.

​Considering the revolution of 1887, the Reform Party had some legitimate grievances, but these amounted to complaints about bad legislation. They provided reasonable grounds for trying to elect new people to the legislature, not for revolution. However, having a dim view of the natives' capacity for governing, the Reformers did not seriously consider the electoral route. According to Chief Justice Judd's statement, the Reform Party achieved its goal by intimidating King Kalakaua. Prior to the revolution, "large quantities of arms had been brought by a secret league from San Francisco and placed amongst its members." Consequently, they managed to array sufficient forces in Honolulu to convince the King to appoint a new cabinet, and to promulgate a new constitution. The new constitution was not presented to the public as a referendum.

​During the first election under the constitution, the foreign population was well armed, and the troops were hostile to the crown and the people. As a result, the Reform Party won a majority in the legislature. But in the 1890 elections, that party lost its hold on power. A majority in the new legislature favored the establishment of a new constitution. The King appointed a new cabinet, and it remained in place until his death in 1891.

​In 1892, the voters elected a closely divided legislature, composed of the Reform, National Reform, and Liberal parties. Lacking a majority, the Reform Party chose to combine with the other parties at different points, in order to vote out objectionable cabinets. It played this game until the Wilcox cabinet, consisting entirely of Reform Party members, was appointed at the end of the year.Unsatisfied with the conduct of the new cabinet, the National Reform and Liberal parties combined to vote it out of power in January 1893. Then the Queen appointed a cabinet opposed to the Reform Party.

​Since the legislature was about to be prorogued for two years, this cabinet was scheduled to govern for that period. The Reform Party's refusal to accept this loss of influence led to its revolt. The Queen's effort to proclaim a new constitution on January 14 provided a pretext, not a cause, for revolt.

​The key constitutional changes contemplated by the Queen concerned the composition of the legislature, and the scope of the franchise. She proposed to give the monarch the power to appoint nobles (up to 24), to allow the number of representatives to increase to a maximum of 48, and to restrict the franchise to subjects of the Kingdom.There was strong demand among the natives for constitutional change; and they were unable, or unwilling, to use the amendment method prescribed in that document.

​When her cabinet advised her against proclaiming a new constitution, the Queen reluctantly agreed with them.A large crowd had assembled outside of the palace in expectation of her announcement. She informed them that she could not proclaim a new constitution now because her ministers advised against it, but that she would proclaim one at some point in the future. The term future was open to interpretation. Some thought it meant within a few days, others thought it meant when a new legislature assembled in 2 years.

​On the morning of January 16, the Queen's government dispelled this ambiguity by distributing a declaration to the public. The declaration stated that the Queen would not seek constitutional change except through the amendment method. This document was distributed throughout Honolulu, and Minister Stevens received a personal copy on the same day. Later that day, two mass meetings were held in Honolulu. One meeting consisted of Liberal and National Reform party supporters who expressed support for the Queen's declaration. The other meeting consisted of Reform Party supporters who were totally dissatisfied with the declaration.

On the next day, January 17, the Queen and her cabinet sent another paper to Stevens iterating the promise contained in the January 16th declaration. The legation's copy of the document had the sentence "Received at the U.S. Legation about 2 P.M," written in ink at the end of the document. At the time of the revolution, the Queen's forces - organized and drilled - occupied the Station House (a well fortified police station), Barracks and palace. They also controlled the vast bulk of non-foreign armaments on Oahu, the island where Honolulu is located.

Secret Preparations for Revolution

Substantial secret preparations preceded the events of the 17^th. On the night of the 14th, secret meetings of foreigners - Americans, Germans, and native Hawaiians of foreign ancestry - commenced. At the first meeting, the participants discussed the subject of revolution, and the ultimate objective of annexation to the United States. A group of these conspirators formed a Committee of Safety, whose principal member was LA Thurston, leader of the Reform Party. On January 15, members of the Committee talked to Minister Stevens. He assured them that he would land troops from the U.S.S. Boston if the Committee asked for such a deployment to protect life and property. Stevens also informed them that if they occupied the Government Building - the administrative center of the Kingdom - and proclaimed a government, he would recognize it.

Next, the Committee called a mass meeting for the afternoon of January 16. At the meeting, the assembled crowd authorized the Committee "to take steps to prevent a consummation of the Queen's purposes and to have guarantees of public safety." The Committee, fearing intervention by the Queen's forces, did not publicize its revolutionary plans. After the mass meeting, it wrote a letter to Stevens requesting the deployment of U.S. troops: "We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and, therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces.” In response, Stevens landed troops. Later in the evening, the Committee met again, and it resolved to overthrow the monarchy, and to establish a new government. Everyone at the meeting believed that Stevens had assured them that if they occupied the Government Building, and proclaimed a new government, he would recognize it as the de facto government of Hawaii.

Revolution

One hundred and sixty two troops from the Boston landed at Honolulu around 5 P.M. on the 16th; the Queen's minister of foreign affairs, Samuel Parker, sent Stevens a letter protesting the deployment. According to the testimony of Parker and A.P. Peterson - both members of the Queen's cabinet - they met with Stevens at 1 P.M. on the 17^th. At the meeting, the minister informed them that if government forces attacked the Committee or its supporters, "he would intervene." At 2:30 P.M, members and supporters of Committee moved to the Government Building. They proceeded in two groups, hoping to approach the building stealthily, because they "[feared] . . . observation or arrest." Before heading to the Government Building, they sent a scout there to determine if it was occupied by government forces. Shortly after arriving at the building, a member of the Committee read the proclamation establishing the Provisional Government.When the reading started, the rebels had no armed supporters in the area. By the end of the proclamation, about 15 armed rebels had arrived; they were reinforced by 30-40 troops within 30 minutes. At this time, the Queen had 546 well armed troops located at the Palace, the Barracks and the Station House - all in close proximity to the Government Building. The troops from the Boston were deployed across the street from the Government Building.It may be inferred that the close proximity of the Boston's troops to the site of the proclamation was designed to signal their support for the rebellion to the Queen. It may also be inferred that their nearness gave the Provisional Government confidence in its own security.

After the proclamation, Stevens recognized the Provisional Government, and stated that he would support it. A delegation from the Provisional Government went to the Station House, where the Queen's government had set up its headquarters. S.M Damon, Vice President of the Provisional Government, told the cabinet that it should surrender because Stevens had recognized the new government; he stated that resistance would lead to bloodshed. Before making a decision, the cabinet went to the Government Building for a conference with the rest of the Provisional Government. After the meeting, it went with Damon to meet with the Queen, and to urge her to surrender to the Provisional Government. After discussing the situation wither her advisers for about an hour, the Queen surrendered for two reasons: first, the Provisional Government was backed by U.S. forces; second, she was assured that her protest would be sent to Washington, and that she would receive a fair hearing. Once the Queen surrendered, the Provisional Government, following a prearranged plan, sent commissioners to Washington seeking annexation.

Stevens' Complicity in the Revolution

Stevens' agreement to land troops to support the Committee of Safety demonstrated his complicity in their plans. Unlike prior deployments of U.S. forces in Hawaii, the Kingdom's government was not notified prior to the landing of troops on the 16th.

​On the 17^th, shortly before 5 P.M., Stevens informed the Queen's cabinet that he had recognized the Provisional Government. At the meeting between the cabinet and the Provisional Government at the Government Building, everyone present, excepting Damon, knew that Stevens had recognized the Provisional Government - Damon stated that he had the impression that they believed this. The conference with the Queen began sometime between four and five P.M., and ended at six P.M. After the conference, the Queen ordered her commanders at the Barracks and Station House to surrender.

​Prior to Damon's arrival at the Station House, and thus before the first meeting between the Provisional Government and the cabinet, many witnesses agreed that the cabinet had received Stevens' letter recognizing the Provisional Government. Damon did not contradict these testimonials, but said that he could not remember the details. Mr. Bolte, another member of the Provisional Government, said he thought Stevens had recognized it after sunset. Mr. Waterhouse, also of the Provisional Government, said it had taken control of the Station House and Barracks before Stevens recognized it.

​The testimony stating that the Queen's cabinet knew that Stevens' had recognized the Provisional Government before it met with it is credible, excluding the testimony of Mr. Colburn, a member of the Queen's last cabinet.

​The best estimate is that Stevens recognized the Provisional Government at around 3:30 PM, almost immediately after the Committee read the proclamation. At that time, there were only sixty armed supporters of the new government at the Government Building. In a conversation with Blount, Stevens said that he knew the Station House and the Barracks were under the Queen's control when he recognized the new government, "but he did not care anything about that, for 25 men, well armed, could have run the whole crowd." A letter on the 17^th, from President Dole of the Provisional Government to Stevens, acknowledged the minister's recognition of the new regime, and stated that the Queen had not yet surrendered the Station House. Dole also requested U.S. support to maintain order, because the forces of his government "may be insufficient to maintain order."

​Overall, Stevens' intervention created the necessary conditions for revolution:

The leaders of the revolutionary movement would not have undertaken it but for Mr. Stevens's promise to protect them against any danger from the Government.But for this their mass meeting would not have been held. But for this no request to land the troops would have been made. Had the troops not been landed no measures for the organization of a new Government would have been taken. The American minister and the revolutionary leaders had determined on annexation to the United States, and had agreed on the part each was to act to the very end.

Aftermath of Revolution

The Provisional Government did not submit its actions to a popular vote. The natives felt injured by the overthrow of the Queen, and they wanted Washington to restore her, but they recognized their incapacity to oppose foreign powers. The ex-Queen believed that the suddenness of the revolution indicated that it had not been planned from Washington, that Stevens was acting independently, and that President Harrison would restore her to power. One of her advisers cited the instance in 1843 when an earlier monarch had yielded the islands to a British representative, on condition that his cause would be heard in London. The British government repudiated the act of its representative, restoring the kingdom to the monarch.

Additional Points

1. Prior to the declaration of a U.S. protectorate over the islands by Stevens, the political situation was stable.

2. On July 9, 1893 the Annexation Club sent a letter to Blount enumerating the number of foreign and native members on its rolls, and the percentage of the population that they represented. Blount compared these figures with the 1890 census records, and found that the percentages were "loose."

3. Seven thousand natives had signed petitions against annexation, along with 249 whites.

4. If put to a popular vote, annexation would be defeated: "The undoubted sentiment of the people is for the Queen, against the Provisional Government and against annexation. A majority of the whites, especially Americans, are for annexation."

5. The sugar planters had the most influence among the white population. They generally believed that U.S. laws banning the importation of contract labor would not be extended to Hawaii in the event of annexation. They also generally favored annexation because they supported the development of Pearl Harbor, and the construction of a cable from California to Hawaii. Additionally, they hoped to evade tariffs on rice and fruit by joining the U.S., and to receive the sugar bounty. The McKinley Tariff had seriously injured the sugar planters. For this group: "Annexation has for its charm the complete abolition of all duties on their exports to the United States."

6. Supporters of annexation expected the United States to restrict the suffrage of natives and asiatics, leaving control in the hands of the whites.

7. "Avoiding details it must be said that the native never held much of the land."

8. Blount thought that the native population had stopped decreasing, and "and will soon increase."

The Aftermath of Revolution​

​The Provisional Government dispatched commissioners to Washington immediately, with the object of arranging annexation to the United States; they also conveyed the Queen's protest to President Harrison. She started the protest by stating that she had evidence that Stevens had backed the rebels with force, and that she believed he would not have acted without authorization from the U.S. government. Next, she explained that she surrendered her throne for three reasons. First, it would have been futile to fight the United States. Second, she wanted to avoid the destruction of life and property that would have resulted from a military conflict. Third, she believed that the United States government would remedy the wrongs inflicted upon her, and her country. She concluded the protest by asking Harrison to not decide on the legitimacy of the revolution until her envoy had an opportunity to present the Queen's view of the conflict.This protest raises two questions: first, if the Queen believed Stevens' conduct was authorized from Washington, why would she expect a fair hearing; second, if she believed the opposite, why would she say that she believed his conduct was authorized. These logical lapses indicate that the Queen had a confused view of Stevens' actions, or that she wanted to present the image of being confused.

​When it learned of the Revolution, the Harrison administration approved Stevens' recognition of the new regime. Secretary Foster wrote: “The rule of this Government has uniformly been to recognize and enter into relations with any actual government in full possession of effective power with the assent of the people.” He ordered Stevens to continue recognizing the Provisional Government “under such conditions.” He expressed the hope that the Revolution would produce closer ties between the U.S. and Hawaii. And he implicitly authorized Stevens to use force to protect the interests of U.S. citizens on the islands, and to help the new government preserve order.

​The new regime had neither effective control of the state, nor popular assent, when Stevens' recognized it, but Foster chose to not investigate the matter. In light of Stevens' dispatches since the middle of 1892, Secretary Foster knew that the minister would not be an unbiased source of information concerning a Hawaiian revolution designed to achieve annexation. Consequently, if he was concerned about the equities of the matter, he should have sought further information. But, untroubled by such considerations, he happily expedited the negotiations for a treaty of annexation. Considering the administration's objectives, Foster's actions were perfectly appropriate. He had a goal, the Revolution presented a wonderful opportunity for achieving it, and he pushed hard to take advantage of the opening.

​After brief negotiations, both governments signed a Treaty of Annexation on February 14. Besides the articles providing for annexation, and the assumption of Hawaiian debt by the U.S., the key points were in articles IV and VI.Article IV required Congressional authorization for further immigration of Chinese laborers into Hawaii. Under Article VI, the U.S. agreed to pay off the Queen and Princess Kaiulani, as long as they submitted “to the authority of the Government of the United States and the local Government of the Islands.” President Harrison adopted Stevens' and Foster's conclusions about the causes and course of the revolution, and he encouraged the Senate to ratify the treaty in order to increase U.S. influence on the islands, and to protect business interests. He also noted that if the U.S. did not annex Hawaii, another great power would do so.Finally, he stated that all of the foreign representatives at Honolulu had recognized the new government.

​During the annexation negotiations in Washington, politics in Hawaii moved forward. In his February dispatches, Stevens stated that the Provisional Government was consolidating its position, that pro-annexation sentiment was increasing, and that the political situation was stable. He reported that he had placed the government under U.S. protection – raising the U.S. flag over the Government Building - for the duration of the annexation negotiations. Also, he requested the deployment of additional warships to Honolulu. Foster approved Stevens' decision to offer U.S. support to the Provisional Government. But he disavowed the minister's decision to establish a U.S. protectorate over the islands, because it implied that the U.S. had a superior political position in the country than the government in Honolulu. The Secretary authorized Stevens to aid the Provisional Government in the spirit of friendly cooperation, but instructed him to take no actions implying an exaltation of U.S. sovereignty over Hawaii's. In a late February dispatch, Stevens wrote that the U.S. flag over the Government Building fostered stability, and that the U.S. was exercising a qualified protectorate over the islands. One hundred and twenty troops from the Boston were still deployed onshore, but they were not interfering in the Provisional Government's affairs. He rounded out his correspondence for the month by encouraging rapid annexation in order to prevent Britain from annexing Hawaii later in the year.

​Clearly, Stevens' contention that the Provisional Government required protection belies his earlier argument that it had controlled Honolulu before he recognized it on January 17th. Foster's dispatches, and Harrison's recommendation to the Senate, show that the administration adopted the fiction provided by Stevens. For all of them, annexation was the priority, unfortunate details would be distorted or ignored to attain that goal.

Part 4: March through December 1893

​Grover Cleveland entered the White House for the second time on March 4, 1893. He inaugurated his Hawaiian policy by withdrawing the Treaty of Annexation from the Senate “for the purpose of reexamination.” This reexamination would lead to the creation of Blount's report, and a radical re-appraisal of America's role in the Hawaiian Revolution. However, as is often the case, the documents dealing with the grand issues of diplomacy are far outnumbered by those addressing the routine of international relations. Thus, before discussing Cleveland's decision to try to peacefully restore Queen Liliuokalani in the fall, we need to cover the seven months leading up to that point.

​The political situation in Hawaii changed little in March and April. In his dispatches to Foster, and then to Cleveland's Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, Stevens described a stable political situation underwritten by U.S. force. The protectorate preserved U.S. influence on the islands, and protected the Provisional Government from foreign pressure. On the latter point, he argued that Britain and Japan were intriguing on the islands, possibly with the goal of annexing them, and he noted that two Japanese warships were present at Honolulu. He alleged that, absent the declaration of a U.S. protectorate over them, Japan would have used force to uphold its interests on the islands in January. The minister's concerns had little influence on the Cleveland administration.

​At the end of March, Blount reached Honolulu. He was appointed to be the President's special commissioner, invested with paramount authority for U.S. affairs on the islands, including the use of force. Additionally, he was instructed to prevent other powers from interfering in Hawaii's domestic affairs. The change in management from Stevens to Blount was felt immediately upon his arrival. On April 1, the Commissioner lowered the U.S. flag hoisted above the Government Building, and ordered the Boston's troops to withdraw to their ship. Blount reported that no public disorders resulted from this change. He also noted that Dole had informed him that the Provisional Government could maintain order if the U.S. troops withdrew, but that those troops had been vital for maintaining order in the post-Revolutionary period. Finally, he emphasized to anyone who asked, presumably including Dole, that U.S. force would only be used to protect American lives and property.

​In early May, Blount reviewed the political situation in Hawaii. When the U.S. flag was pulled down from above the Government Building, anti-annexation groups began expressing their views more freely, and a vigorous public debate materialized. A large majority of the island's inhabitants opposed annexation; the pro-annexation group wanted to suppress opposition through “social and business hostility.” The Reform Party backed annexation; most of its opponents were against it, and wanted to restore the Queen; and a small group opposed both annexation and restoration, preferring an independent republic. Those natives who supported annexation conditioned their position on a guaranteed franchise for themselves. He ended his review by tentatively concluding that Stevens' support had been essential for the success of the rebels.

​In the rest of his May dispatches, Blount stated that the Provisional Government was being pressured to deport or arrest himself. Similarly, pro-annexation papers urged threats to deport the ex-Queen and other leading natives.Additionally, he reported that some natives were being coerced into signing petitions for annexation. Overall, he was very concerned about the islands' political stability. To help dispel the risk of conflict, he published an announcement on May 16 to all of the American citizens on the islands. It declared that U.S. troops would not protect them if they participated in “any conflict in behalf of either party,” and stated that he would not interfere in any domestic conflicts. On a more personal note, he complained that pro-annexation papers had written articles defaming him, in an effort to stop individuals and groups opposed to annexation from communicating with him. Those papers hoped to hinder his efforts to obtain an accurate picture of Hawaiian affairs. The Commissioner had a distorted view of this matter. The article that he cites to support his claim does not substantiate it; rather, it offers a plausible interpretation of his meeting with Liliuokalani. While a careful investigator, Blount sometimes got the facts wrong.

​The political calm continued through June, but Blount had concerns about the possibility of future violence. He reported that the natives believed that the United States would restore the ex-Queen, despite the fact that he had published his instructions from Washington which showed that he was only on a fact-finding mission. He feared the outbreak of violence if the natives were disabused of their faith on this point.

​The next three months were uneventful. Blount transmitted his full report to Gresham on July 17. He resigned from his post at the end of September; and his replacement, Albert Willis, reached the islands in early November. Willis would be responsible for implementing Cleveland's policy, which was based on a close reading of Blount's report. Gresham's October 18 instructions to Willis encapsulate the policy.

​The Secretary stated that Cleveland would not re-submit the annexation treaty to the Senate. I. Willis is instructed to communicate this information to the Queen, and to tell her that Cleveland intends to restore her to power. However, he is also instructed to tell the Queen "that, when reinstated, the President expects that she will pursue a magnanimous course by granting full amnesty to all who participated in the movement against her, including persons who are, or have been, officially or otherwise, connected with the Provisional Government, depriving them of no right or privilege which they enjoyed before the so-called revolution. All obligations created by the Provisional Government in due course of administration should be assumed." II. "Having secured the Queen's agreement to pursue this wise and humane policy, which it is believed you will speedily obtain, you will then advise the executive of the Provisional Government and his ministers of the President's determination of the question which their action and that of the Queen devolved upon him, and that they are expected to promptly relinquish to her constitutional authority." III. Finally: "Should the Queen decline to pursue the liberal course suggested, or should the Provisional Government refuse to abide by the President's decision, you will report the facts and await further directions."

​Cleveland wanted the ex-Queen to forget that she had been violently overthrown, to forgive the rebels, assume their obligations, and restore the status quo that had existed on the morning of January 17. Once the ex-Queen agreed to these terms, he wanted the Provisional Government to surrender to her, just as peacefully as she had surrendered to them. And on top of this, he did not want to provide military guarantees to anyone.

​Even if this policy had succeeded temporarily, it is easy to imagine the outbreak of another revolution in 1894 or 1895. It is true that in a straight fight between the Queen and the Committee in January, the latter party would have been vanquished. But, in 1887, the Reform Party had assembled an armed force that intimidated King Kalakaua; and on that occasion, the president had applauded the outcome. The most important characteristic of power balances is that they often shift, and without U.S. support, the Hawaiian throne would be a perilous pedestal. To be fair, it had been a dangerous chair in January as well. But if the Queen had been restored under Cleveland's policy, her position would have been less secure than it had been at that time. A sovereign who cannot punish treason, and crush rebellions, does not command respect; the punishing and crushing need not be violent, but it does need to be decisive for a government to maintain its authority.Additionally, in January, Liliuokalani had commanded a formidable body of troops capable of maintaining order on the islands, absent foreign intervention; under Cleveland's rubric, she would have had to rebuild her forces. Until she did so, she would have been deeply vulnerable to another rebellion. At bottom, Cleveland offered to restore the Queen to a less secure perch than she had occupied at the beginning of the year; assuming, of course, that it could be done easily.

​The policy left much to be desired, but at least Willis implemented it with vigor. His November reports to Gresham reveal an increasingly chaotic political situation in Hawaii. The Provisional Government imported weapons to improve its military. The Japanese Minister requested protection for Japanese residents in case of violence.Overall, uncertainty about U.S. plans created an unstable political environment. To try to pacify the situation, he issued a declaration stating that “mob violence would not be allowed” while the U.S. Government decided on its course of action. He thought it had a calming effect on the political maelstrom. On November 13, Willis interviewed the ex-Queen. He relayed Cleveland's messages to her, following the script of his instructions. Unimpressed by the expectation of amnesty, Liliuokalani stated that she would treat the rebels according to Hawaii's laws, meaning that their property would be confiscated, and their heads chopped off. Later in the conversation, she relented a bit, suggesting that deportation and property confiscation might be sufficient. Willis left this interview thinking that if Liliuokalani was restored, she would abolish the 1887 constitution “which would mean the overthrow of constitutional and limited government and the absolute dominion of the Queen.” To his credit, he also informed Gresham that the Queen's insistence that treason should be punished by death and confiscation was perfectly consistent with Hawaii's penal code. Finally, he urged prompt action by Washington, due to the precarious nature of the situation.

​Back in the capitol, Gresham thought that Willis was the one who was moving too slowly. He sent additional instruction to the minister on November 24: “The brevity and uncertainty of your telegrams are embarrassing. You will insist upon amnesty and recognition of obligations of the Provisional Government as essential conditions of restoration. All interests will be promoted by prompt action.” This criticism lacked merit; Willis could not move to the second stage of Cleveland's plan until the ex-Queen agreed to the conditions of restoration. Nevertheless, Gresham vented the administration's frustration with the ex-Queen's recalcitrance by sending a fresh set of instructions to Willis on December 3^rd.

I. "Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's unqualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional Government in a proper course of administration shall be assumed, and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Government. The President feels that by our original interference and what followed, we have incurred responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at the mercy of the other."

II. “Should the Queen ask whether if she accedes to conditions active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her restoration, or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that the President cannot use force without the authority of Congress.”

III. “Should the Queen accept conditions and the Provisional Government refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous instructions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the United States will hold the Queen to fulfillment of stipulated conditions you will say, the President acting under dictates of honor and duty, as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.”

​I. In October, Cleveland offered conditional sympathy to the ex-Queen. Now he presented her with an ultimatum.He whitewashed this abrasive demand by claiming an obligation to the entire population of Hawaii, including the Provisional Government and its supporters. This argument is ridiculous. The fact that Harrison favored the Reform Party did not impose an obligation on Cleveland to protect that group; governments change policies all the time, and in the United States, a change of administration is expected to lead to new policy priorities. Accepting, as Cleveland did, that the United States had acted immorally in January 1893, the logical policy would be to remedy the wrong by punishing the perpetrators, and compensating the victims.Furthermore, since he also accepted Blount's conclusion that the majority of Hawaii's people opposed the Provisional Government, actions designed to punish that group would, practically speaking, fulfill America's responsibilities to the whole Hawaiian community. All government policies, from infrastructure investments to declarations of war, involve prioritization of interests. Even the best regime cannot equally uphold the interests of an entire nation.

​Regardless of what one thinks of Cleveland's conditions, his policy would not have reversed the results of the Revolution. Rather, it would have created a situation where the Queen had diminished authority, while the Reform Party returned to the same position that it had occupied before the Revolution. The kindest interpretation of this policy is that it would have mitigated the impact of America's misconduct in January.

​In justice to Cleveland, his policy was sensible from a mechanical standpoint. If the ex-Queen agreed to the conditions, the Provisional Government might be persuaded to surrender quietly, and the U.S. could claim a diplomatic victory. This still sounds like fantasy, but it is flavored with the spice of rationality.

​II. Even if Liliuokalani agreed to the conditions, Cleveland offered her no guarantee that he would use force to restore her to her throne; he did not even promise to take active measures to achieve that object. To justify his reticence, he argued that Congress had to authorize military actions. Disregarding the legal question here, clearly Cleveland could have promised to ask Congress to use force to restore the ex-Queen if the Provisional Government did not surrender peacefully. His refusal to make this promise shows the true nature of his policy.

​III. Interestingly, in the event that Liliuokalani agreed to the conditions, Gresham instructed Willis to promise the Provisional Government that, if it yielded peacefully, the President “will do all in his constitutional power to cause observance of the conditions he has imposed.” Here, the Constitution is cited as a document that empowers presidential action; in the previous part of the instructions, it was cited as a law that restricts executive power. The difference in emphasis may mean that whereas he wanted to dampen the ex-Queen's expectations, he wanted to encourage the Provisional Government to give up without a fight. A less charitable interpretation is that he thought Liliuokalani would be easy to control, so he would not have to do much to make her fulfill the conditions.

​On December 4, in his annual message to Congress, Cleveland declared that the United States had actively helped the rebels overthrow the Queen and establish a Provisional Government. He expressed his qualified desire to restore the Queen, and informed Congress that he had instructed Willis to pursue this objective. Lastly, he noted that he would provide Congress with a fuller description of his policy when he received further information from Willis. This message produced a vigorous response from L.A. Thurston, who was representing the Provisional Government in Washington. In a letter to Gresham, he insisted on the Provisional Government's sovereignty, rejected the idea that, absent annexation, the U.S. had a right to determine who governs Hawaii. Next, he argued that if the Queen is restored she would be rapidly overthrown, unless her regime had foreign military support.In conclusion, he emphasized the Provisional Government's amity towards the United States, and its desire for annexation.

​Affairs in Hawaii became more agitated when the administration's views about the Revolution and restoration reached the islands. In early December, Willis reported that a British and a Japanese warship had arrived at Honolulu, awaiting the outcome of the annexation controversy. Also, the Provisional Government had commenced defensive preparation. It fortified the palace, now called the executive building, and handed out weapons to all who agreed to support the government. Willis worried about the possibility of mob violence, because many of the people being armed were stupid, excitable, and did not have a property stake in the status quo. The minister emphasized that the political environment was crackling, but he hoped that the current state of stability will persist for the near future.

​At this point, we will make a brief digression to discuss whether Cleveland’s policy faced significant domestic or external constraints. The fact that the Provisional Government was handing out weapons to all persons who promised to support it, demonstrates that it lacked strong, organized forces to defend itself, despite the fact that it had been in power for almost a year.Additionally, as the president pointed out in his December 18 message to Congress, the Provisional Government was an oligarchy that lacked popular support; its unpopularity, and deficient military resources, means that it is unlikely that a civil war or insurgency would have erupted if the United States had expelled it from power. The members of the government knew that Hawaii was a pygmy compared to the United States, and that they had no hope of successful resistance if Washington ordered in the troops.Consequently, if Cleveland seriously wanted to restore the Queen, the mere threat of force would almost certainly have been sufficient – whatever his perceptions about Constitutional limitations on the use of force, that document imposes no limits on the use of threats. If the threat did not achieve its object, the president could have asked Congress for a declaration of war; but he never made the request. To be fair to the president, Congress would probably have opposed the use of force; however, there is no indication that Cleveland's decision to not seek a declaration of war was based on his perception of Congressional politics. In any event, had he believed that the use of force was appropriate, he could have tried to persuade Congress to adopt his position; Cleveland was a pugnacious politician who was willing to vigorously confront Congress when necessary. In combination, these circumstances demonstrate that, if he had been inclined to do so, Cleveland could have constructed and implemented a much more vigorous policy. Thus, to explain why he did not pursue a more heroic course of action, we must focus on his personal beliefs.

On December 5, C.B. Wilson, previously the Kingdom's marshal, gave Willis him a paper titled “Procedures for Restoration," which had been approved by the ex-Queen and members of her last cabinet.” Willis told Gresham that the document boded ill for good governance, and for U.S. influence on the islands, if Liliuokalani was restored. Despite the minister's objections, the document indicated that members of the Provisional Government might be treated leniently.

​On December 16, Willis had a second interview with Liliuokalani. The ex-Queen began by saying that her views expressed in the prior interview remained the same. As before, she conceded that deportation and property confiscation would be sufficient punishment for the Provisional Government and its supporters. Here she specifically withdrew her insistence on capital punishment.Deportation was necessary because the rebels might revolt again if allowed to stay in the country. Also, deported persons and their children should be permanently barred from returning to Hawaii. The Queen said that she would assume the legitimate obligations accrued by the Provisional Government in the course of governing the country, even if the expenditures were not authorized by Hawaiian law. However, the costs incurred by the new government for military and police purposes should be paid from the confiscated property. On constitutional matters, she said that she would like to promulgate a new constitution to replace the 1887 document. The new constitution would give equal privileges to all of her subjects, native and foreign, principally by eliminating the property qualification for voting for nobles.

​Although the ex-Queen's position did not meet Cleveland's conditions for restoration, she was clearly in a mood to negotiate, since she had dropped her insistence on capital punishment, and was willing to assume all of the obligations of the Provisional Government, except those incurred for police and military forces. On December 18, Willis had a third interview with Liliuokalani, at which he told her that Cleveland would stop his efforts to restore her if she did not agree to the conditions. The ex-Queen did not budge. But, on the following day, she yielded. Apparently influenced by the views of an adviser, J.O. Carter, she sent Willis a letter, with a signed statement attached. She declared that, if restored, she would grant full amnesty to the members of the Provisional Government and its supporters. Additionally, she would agree to adhere to the provisions of the 1887 constitution. Finally, she would “assume all the obligations created by the Provisional Government, in the proper course of administration, including all expenditures for military or police services.”

​With the ex-Queen's assurances in hand, on December 20 Willis informed the Provisional Government of Cleveland's decision – put forth in his December 18 message to Congress - to permanently withdraw the Treaty of Annexation from the Senate, and of the president's hope to peacefully restore the Queen. Not surprisingly, the new government rejected the President's request that it dissolve itself, and yield its authority to the Queen.

​These climactic events occurred after Cleveland delivered his message to Congress on December 18. He began the message by referring the Hawaiian question to Congressional consideration, and he noted that the papers submitted to the Senate with the Treaty of Annexation had shown three things: first, the Provisional Government was not supported by popular revolution or referendum; second, the move from revolution to submission of the Treaty of Annexation took only 32 days, including fifteen days of travel between Honolulu and Washington; third, it was unclear whether U.S. troops had supported the Revolution.

​Faced with these issues, he had withdrawn the treaty from the Senate, and sent Blount to investigate whether the U.S. had participated in the revolution. The President explained that Blount had served in the House of Representatives for nine terms, and was chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs. Next, he expressed agreement with Blount's conclusion that U.S. forces were involved in the overthrow of the Queen. After reviewing the report's findings, Cleveland concluded that the Provisional Government was established by U.S. force, that it lacked popular support in January, and had not improved its public standing since then. He described it as an oligarchy.

​In light of these circumstances, he said that he would not resubmit the Treaty of Annexation to the Senate, because annexation under such conditions would be immoral. He emphasized this last point with a strikingly eloquent sentence: “I mistake the American people if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality, that there is one law for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by indirection a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its territory.” As a result, the U.S. had an obligation to remedy this injustice: “By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair.”

​Next, the President stated that these considerations have striking force here: Liliuokalani surrendered to the U.S. conditionally, expecting a fair hearing in Washington; the Provisional Government accepted her surrender on those terms, and even encouraged her to surrender to avoid bloodshed, noting that she could expect a fair hearing in Washington. But, because they were encouraged and supported by a U.S. minister, the Provisional Government was entitled to some protection from the United States.Consequently, Cleveland told the Congress, he had informed the Queen that she would have to give amnesty to the members and supporters of the Provisional Government if she wanted to be restored. Additionally, he told her that she would have to recognize the Provisional Government's bona fide acts and obligations.

​Towards the end of the speech Cleveland summarized the bases of his restoration policy. First, he believed that the Queen and the Provisional Government would agree to restoration with amnesty. Second, the Queen and the Provisional Government had agreed to submit the matter to U.S. arbitration. Third, by its own declaration, the Provisional Government was designed to exist only until the terms of annexation had been settled. These factors led him to think that once the Provisional Government was informed that the U.S. would not annex Hawaii, he could resolve the matter peacefully.

​The President concluded his speech by noting that, thus far, the Queen had rejected these conditions, even though she had been told that U.S. efforts to restore her would cease if she did not acquiesce. Because of the Queen's rejection of the conditions, he had not been able to put a proposal for her restoration to the Provisional Government. The President ended his message by handing the problem to Congress, asking it to find an appropriate solution.

Cleveland's attitude did not change after he learned that Liliuokalani had agreed to his terms, and that the Provisional Government had rejected his request. On January 12, 1894 Gresham wrote to Willis that he had “discharged the onerous task confided to [him].” He stated that the matter was in the hands of Congress, and that the President would keep that body informed of current developments in the islands. The matter had been dropped by the executive, and Congress would eventually follow its lead. The Provisional Government did not obtain annexation; but it retained control of Hawaii.

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CHAPTER 3
CLEVELAND’S OPERATIONAL CODE

In a useful article, Stephen G. Walker and Timothy G. Murphy described the circumstances when a leader’s operational code is most likely to affect decision-making: “innovative decision-making situations; long-range policy planning situations; decisions under very complex, ambiguous, or unanticipated circumstances; decisions under stress; and decisions by individuals at the top of a bureaucratic hierarchy.” Cleveland's Hawaiian policy meets four of these criteria. First, the President needed to decide the political fate of a country that would have substantial military and economic significance for the United States in the future. Second, he had to craft a policy that accounted for America's material interests, and his own moral sensibilities; this is a classic problem of statesmanship, but no less complex and ambiguous for that. Third, his ministers at Honolulu persistently warned him that if the U.S. did not take decisive action, one way or the other, there could be further domestic upheaval in Hawaii, and another power might seek to undermine America's influence in the islands. Add in the Panic of 1893, along with painful and secretive surgery, and it becomes clear that Cleveland was operating under a great deal of stress at this time. Fourth, the president occupied the top of the decision-making hierarchy. The only criterion that his policy did not meet is the first one.

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He was not confronted with an innovative decision-making situation, because he had dealt with the 1887 Revolution during his first administration, and he was familiar with Hawaii's turbulent history. Overall, Cleveland's policy is a good candidate for operational code analysis.

Cleveland's code has been constructed from the presidential papers for the first administration (1885-1889), and the first year of the second administration (1893). His December 18, 1893 message on Hawaii is excluded from the data set, since the central goal of this analysis is to explain the decision that he announced in that message.Three rules were applied to select papers for the data set: first, they had to relate to foreign policy; second, when there is a clear delineation between foreign and domestic issues, only the section dealing with foreign affairs was included; third, messages that simply transmitted material to Congress were excluded, as were those which transmitted treaties to the Senate for ratification, unless they contained specific statements relevant to the president's philosophical and instrumental beliefs. After assembling the data, the papers were coded using the Verbs in Context System.

The Verbs in Context System ("VICS") is a content analysis system designed to determine the beliefs of political leaders: "The premise for the system is that the way individuals speak about power relationships in the political universe will tell us much about their beliefs regarding the exercise of power." The system codes verbs to measure "intensities of conflict, cooperation, and participation in the international system" Additionally, the coding process identifies "various forms of the exercise of power as identified by scholars who conceptualize power as a control relationship between self and other." The process distinguishes between words and deeds: "Deeds indicate the exercise of power in the form of positive and negative actions [rewards and punishments]. Words represent the exercise of power in the form of making threats and promises or in the form of invoking authority to support or oppose actions between states or other agents in world politics." The data for VICS analyses are speech acts, meaning written or spoken statements by the subject who is being examined. Thirty five speech acts were coded for this analysis, totaling seventy one pages of text.

To code a speech act, first identify utterances in the document; an utterance is a verbal unit containing a subject and a transitive verb. Second, determine the direction of the verb (+ for cooperative/ - for conflictual). If a verb has a neutral direction, skip it. Third, determine the intensity of the verb (+3 = reward, +2 = promise, +1 = support, -1 = oppose, -2 = threaten, -3 = punish). Note that only rewards and punishments are classified as deeds, the other actions are classified as words. Fourth, determine whether the subject is taking about self (or in groups), or others; references to others are used to construct the philosophical component of the operational code, while references to self (or in groups) are used to construct the instrumental component. Finally, include any other contextual information, like whether an utterance concerns the domestic or international domain, that is important for the research project. The following phrase is an example of an utterance: "I [Cleveland] do not favor a policy of acquisition of new and distant territory." This utterance should be coded +1 Self because the subject is Cleveland, the verb's direction is cooperative, and it is a statement of the president's belief, not a description of a deed.

Once all of the speech acts in the data set have been coded, aggregate the results, and plug them into the seventeen indices that provide quantitative answers to George's ten questions. The formulae for the indices are provided in the appendix; the meaning of each index is described below.

Before presenting Cleveland's operational code, let us review George's questions.

Philosophical Questions

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations?Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical developments? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Questions

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interest?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

Table 2. Results of VICS Analysis – Philosophical Beliefs

First Administration:
1885-1889

First Administration + 1893: 1885-1893

P-1

.345

.42

P-2

.304

.372

P-3

Practically 1*

Practically 1

P-4

.586

.588

P-5

.414

.412

* The true result is minutely lower than 1.

Table 3. Results of VICS Analysis – Instrumental Beliefs

First Administration:
1885-1889

First Administration + 1893: 1885-1893

I-1

.598

.612

I-2

.396

.422

I-3

practically 1

practically 1

I-4

a. .402; b. .875

a. .388; b. .898

I-5

Support and reward
most common

Support and reward
most common

P-1: The P-1 scale ranges from -1 to +1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader sees other states as hostile actors, while results at the high end indicate that he sees them as friendly entities. It is convenient to think of this scale in terms of quadrants. ​

Table 4. P-1 Quadrants

Quadrant 1

Quadrant 2

Quadrant 3

Quadrant 4

Meaning

Very hostile

Fairly hostile

Fairly friendly

Very friendly

Value

-1 to -.5

-.5 to 0

0 to .5

.5 to 1

Cleveland's scores of .345 and .42 lie in the upper end of quadrant 3, and show that he viewed other states as fairly friendly actors.​

P-2: The P-2 scale ranges from -1 to +1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader is pessimistic about his chances of achieving objectives that are consistent with his fundamental values; results at the high end indicate that he is optimistic in this respect.

Table 5. P-2 Quadrants

Quadrant 1

Quadrant 2

Quadrant 3

Quadrant 4

Meaning

Very pessimistic

Fairly pessimistic

Fairly optimistic

Very optimistic

Value

-1 to -.5

-.5 to 0

0 to .5

.5 to 1

Cleveland's scores of .304 and .372 lie at the upper end of quadrant 3, showing his belief that he had a reasonable chance of successfully implementing policies that were in line with his fundamental values.

P-3: The P-3 scale ranges from 0 to 1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader believes that other states behave in an unpredictable manner, whereas results at the high end indicate the reverse. Cleveland's results of 1 and 1 lie at the top of the range, showing that he believed that other states behaved in a highly predictable manner.

​P-4: The P-4 scale ranges from 0 to 1. Results at the low end indicate that a leader believes he has little capacity to influence the course of history, while high scores indicate the reverse. Cleveland's scores of .586 and .588 show that he had a balanced view of his capacity to affect events. He thought that he could have a significant impact on how history unfolded, but he did not believe that he could dominate events.

​P-5: The P-5 scale ranges from 0 to 1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader believes chance plays a small role in international affairs, whereas results at the high end indicate the reverse. Cleveland's scores of .414 and .412 show that he believed that chance played an important role in world affairs, but did not determine their outcome. His balanced view of chance is consistent with his belief that he could significantly influence, but not dominate, the course of history.

​I-1: The I-1 scale ranges from -1 to +1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader believes a conflictual strategy is most likely to achieve his objectives; in contrast, results at the high end indicate a belief that a cooperative strategy is most likely to achieve those objectives.

Table 6. I-1 Quadrants

Quadrant 1

Quadrant 2

Quadrant 3

Quadrant 4

Meaning

Conflictual strategy highly effective

Conflictual strategy fairly effective

Cooperative strategy fairly effective

Cooperative strategy highly effective

Value

-1 to -.5

-.5 to 0

0 to .5

.5 to 1

Cleveland's scores of .598 and .612 lie at the low end of quadrant 4, demonstrating his belief that cooperation, rather than conflict, offered the best route for achieving his foreign policy goals.

​I-2: The I-2 scale ranges from -1 to +1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader believes that conflictual tactics are more effective than cooperative ones in world politics, while results at the high end of the range indicate the reverse.

Table 7. I-2 Quadrants

Quadrant 1

Quadrant 2

Quadrant 3

Quadrant 4

Meaning

Conflictual tactics highly effective

Conflictual tactics fairly effective

Cooperative tactics fairly effective

Cooperative tactics highly effective

Value

-1 to -.5

-.5 to 0

0 to .5

.5 to 1

Cleveland's scores of .396 and .422 lie at the high end of quadrant 3, indicating that he believed that cooperative tactics were substantially more effective than conflictual ones.​

I-3: The I-3 scale ranges from 0 to 1. Results at the low end of the range indicate that a leader is averse to taking risks to achieve his objectives, whereas results at the high end indicate a willingness to take risks. Cleveland's scores of 1 and 1 show that he was very willing to take risks to achieve his foreign policy goals.

​I-4: a. The I-4a scale ranges from 0 to 1. Results at the low end of the spectrum indicate that the leader consistently prefers to use either conflictual or cooperative tactics; in contrast, results at the higher end indicate that the leader is flexible in his choice of tactics. Additionally, this index measures how a leader deals with a particular kind of risk - the risk of being dominated by another state, balanced against the risk of having one's policy stymied by inter-state disagreements. Cleveland's scores of .402 and .388 show that, while he aired towards rigidity in his selection of tactics, he was still somewhat flexible when deciding whether to seek conflict or cooperation. In particular, these scores indicate that when confronted with the risk of being dominated, versus the risk of being stymied, Cleveland was not very flexible in his selection of tactics.

​b. The I-4b scale ranges from 0 to 1. Results at the low end of the spectrum indicate that the leader strongly prefers to use either words or deeds; results at the high end indicate greater flexibility in this regard. Additionally, this index measures how a leader deals with another kind of risk - the risk of doing too much, balanced against the risk of doing too little. Cleveland's scores of .875 and .898 show that he was highly flexible when deciding whether to use words or deeds. In particular, the scores show that when presented with the risk of doing too much versus too little, he was highly flexible in his selection of words or deeds.

​I-5: This section is composed of six indices. Each one measures how often a leader resorts to a particular coded action - punish, threaten, oppose, support, promise, or reward - and each has a scale ranging from 0 to 1. Higher scores indicate that a leader is more likely to use a particular type of action.

Table 8. I-5 Indices

Type of Action

First Administration:
1885-1889

First Administration + 1893: 1885-1893

Punish

.069

.059

Threaten

.037

.032

Oppose

.1

.101

Support

.387

.38

Promise

.032

.032

Reward

.369

.390

By a wide margin, Cleveland was most likely to support (.387 and .38), or reward (.369 and .390). His next most likely action was opposition (.1 and .101). Promises, threats and punishments are rare.

​To sum up, Cleveland viewed other states as reasonably friendly actors, who behaved in a predictable manner. He believed that he could implement effective foreign policies that would influence events in a favorable direction, while recognizing that chance played an important role in human affairs. He thought that cooperative behavior was more likely to produce positive results than conflictual actions. He was very willing

to take risks to achieve his foreign policy goals, perhaps because he strongly preferred cooperative actions, which he may have perceived as being less risky than aggressive ones. Finally he was much more likely to take cooperative actions than conflictual ones; and even when taking conflictual actions, he preferred to express opposition to another country's conduct, rather than using threats or punishments.

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CHAPTER 4
APPLYING THE CODE TO CLEVELAND’S HAWAII POLICY

Cleveland's policy may be divided into three key decisions: (1) withdrawal of the annexation treaty from the Senate, and sending Blount to investigate; (2) dispatch of three sets of instructions to Willis; (3) December 18, message to Congress. We will assess each decision to determine if his operational code explains the president's conduct.

​1. Cleveland withdrew the treaty of annexation from the Senate for three reasons: first, the Provisional Government rose to power without a popular revolution or referendum; second, only thirty days elapsed between the revolution and the submission of the treaty to the Senate; third, it was unclear whether U.S. troops had supported the revolution. The president suspected that the ex-Queen had been the victim of a premeditated coup by a small group of her subjects who may have been supported by the U.S. forces at Honolulu. To obtain an accurate picture of the situation, he sent Blount to Hawaii to conduct aninvestigation of the Revolution.

​Cleveland was well disposed towards other states, because he viewed them as friendly entities. Thus, the possibility that the ex-Queen had been violently overthrown with American support alarmed him.Additionally, while confident that he could effectively implement his policies, he appreciated the role of chance, and recognized that he could not single handedly determine the course of history. This circumspect view of his own capacity encouraged him to make deliberative decisions, based on the best

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information, in order to maximize the likelihood that he could construct sound policies, and implement them effectively. Finally, since he favored cooperative actions, he probably hoped to find a compromise solution to the impasse between the ex-Queen and the Provisional Government. To pursue that course of action, he first needed to understand the causes, course, and aftermath of the Revolution. In combination, these factors explain his decision to withdraw the treaty, which gave him time to deliberate, and to dispatch Blount, who would gather accurate intelligence.

2. Cleveland launched his diplomatic initiative in October; it had three components. First, he aimed to persuade the ex-Queen to grant amnesty to members of the Provisional Government, and to assume that regime's obligations, in exchange for restoration. Second, he wanted the Provisional Government to yield power to the ex-Queen, with the understanding that Cleveland would exert pressure to ensure that she adhered to his conditions. Third, he did not want to use force to restore the Queen.

​The president's belief that other states were fairly friendly actors was tested by events in Hawaii. From Blount's report, he knew that a small group of whites had overthrown a legitimate government, using the threat of American military action as their key bargaining chip. He was outraged by these circumstances, believing that the rebels, and minister Stevens, had acted abominably.Nevertheless, he insisted from the outset that the rebels receive amnesty, and he consistently refused to use force to dislodge their government. The most plausible interpretation of these facts is that Cleveland detested the Provisional Government, but did not think it was sufficiently degenerate to warrant the execution and expropriation called for by Hawaiian law, or to be violently expelled from power by American troops.1 At bottom, the actions of the rebels challenged, but did not overthrow, his positive view of other states.

​Since the Provisional Government fit within Cleveland's view of the political universe, it is not surprising that the president's diplomacy conformed to the other aspects of his operational code. There is no indication in the documents that Cleveland thought his policy would fail. This expectation of success is consistent with three of his beliefs: first, that he could predict the behavior of other states, and hence how they would respond to his initiatives; second, that he could implement foreign policies that achieved his fundamental goals; and third, that he could positively influence the course of history. Additionally, the fact that Gresham's first set of instruction to Willis stated that if either the ex-Queen, or the Provisional Government did not cooperate he should seek further instructions from Washington, demonstrates that Cleveland contemplated the possibility that his plan would be stymied, showing that his confidence was tempered by an appreciation of the role of chance. Finally, his objective of brokering a compromise between the Provisional Government and the ex-Queen is consistent with his preference for cooperative strategies and tactics, and his belief that such methods were more likely to succeed than conflictual ones. The president's willingness to take risks is not relevant in this case, because his chosen policy did not involve significant risks to the U.S. At worst, the Provisional Government would stay in power, and despite Cleveland's low opinion of its moral character, he could work with it to promote American interests.

​3. In his December 18 message to Congress, Cleveland permanently withdrew the treaty of annexation from the Senate, stated that his Hawaiian policy had been stymied, and handed the issue over to Congress. He did not revisit the matter even after learning that Liliuokalani had agreed to his conditions. At no point did he ask the legislature to authorize the use of force. This decision is consistent with the policy that he initiated in October. He had sought to resolve the political impasse in Hawaii through cooperative measures, when his diplomacy failed, he accepted defeat and moved on to other matters. Because the Provisional Government fit within his positive view of other states, he saw no need to depart from his preference for cooperative methods when dealing with Hawaiian affairs; consequently, when those methods failed to achieve his objectives, he did not think he had to escalate matters by using more forceful means. Thus, just as it explains the initiation of his policy in October, his operational code explains the conclusion of that policy in December.

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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

At the beginning of 1893, a small group of white property-holders overthrew the legitimate monarch of Hawaii with American support. At the end of the year, the revolutionaries remained in power, and had every prospect of maintaining permanent control of the archipelago. In the intervening period, Grover Cleveland sought to reverse the results of the revolution by restoring Liliuokalani to her throne. His efforts proved futile, and he dropped the matter in December.

​The operational code theory, applied using the Verbs in Context System, provides valuable insight into these events. It reveals that while Cleveland detested the Provisional Government, it fit within his overarching, positive view of other states; consequently, he did not see the need to depart from his strong preference for cooperative strategy and tactics when dealing with the new regime. Previous historians have explained Cleveland's policy in terms of his moral convictions, internal and external constraints, and the influence of advisors.However, the solution to the puzzle lies in Cleveland's operational code, because he very nearly had a free hand when dealing with Hawaii, and he responded to the views of his advisors based on his political beliefs. Olney's position on Hawaiian affairs prevailed because it was consistent with the president's operational code; there is no indication in the documents that he changed Cleveland's mind.​​​​​​​​​

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Concerning the quality of Cleveland's decision-making, we have seen that it left much to be desired. After reading Cleveland's soaring rhetoric about the despicability of the Provisional Government, and the United States' obligation to not abuse smaller powers, one is struck by the feebleness of his policy, not its moral character. The president is often praised for taking morality into account in his decision-making; and the common narrative is that his morality was tempered by a needed dose of realism.This presentation of events would be persuasive if Cleveland faced significant constraints when constructing his policy; but there were no such limitations. Merely threatening to use force would probably have been s; sufficient to expel the Provisional Government from power, and restore the ex-Queen. If the threat failed, he could have sought a declaration of war from Congress. If he had ultimately deployed troops to achieve his goal, they would have quickly overthrown the Provisional Government, and it is probable that the majority of Hawaii’s inhabitants would have greeted Liliuokalani's restoration with acclamation.

​President Cleveland made a restricted effort to remedy a gross injustice, and for that he deserves credit, but that is the limit of his achievement.

​

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APPENDIX
THE VICS INDICES

P-1: "Percentage of positive utterances about others minus the percentage of negative utterances about others."

P-2: First, group all utterances referring to others into their intensity categories (-3 to +3). Second, multiply the number of entries in each category by the category's weight. Third, add up the totals, and divide the result by the total number of verbs coded as other. Finally, divide that result by three.

-For the 1895-1893 period, the calculation is: (-90 + -4 + -5 + 11 + 8 + 183)/113/3. The values in parenthesis are the weighted values of the utterances in each intensity category, and 113 is the total number of utterances referring to others.

P-3: 1-(Index of Qualitative Variation). "The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N ['number of cases'] and the same number of variable classifications [here, the six categories of -3, +3 etc.]. Ii For this index, only utterances related to others are included in the calculations.

P-4: Calculate "the number of self utterances divided by the sum of self utterances plus other utterances"

-For the 1895-1893 period, the calculation is 131/(187 + 131). 187 is the number of self utterances, and 131 is the number of other utterances.

P-5: 1 - [(result of P-3) x (result for P-4)].

I-1: Calculate "the percentage of cooperative (+) utterances made when talking about self minus the percentage of conflictual (-) utterances regarding self."

-In the 1895-1893 period, Cleveland made 186 utterances about self (36 conflictual, and 150 cooperative). Thus .194 (36/186) is the percent of conflictual self utterances, and 806 is the percent of cooperative self utterances. So the calculation for this period is .806 - .194.

I-2: First, group all utterances referring to self into their intensity categories (-3 to +3). Second, multiply the number of entries in each category by the category's weight (-3 to

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+3). Third, add up the totals, and divide the result by the total number of verbs coded as self. Finally, divide that result by three.

-For the 1885-1893 period, the calculation is (-33 + -12 + -20 + 71 + 12 + 219)/187/3. The numbers in parenthesis are the weighted values of self utterances, and 187 is the total number of self utterances.

I-3: 1- (Index of Qualitative Variation). Apply the method described in P-3, but only use utterances relating to self.

I-4:​a. "One minus the absolute value of [the percentage of cooperative self utterances minus the percentage of conflictual self utterances"]

​

​b. "One minus the absolute value of [the percentage of word self utterances minus ​the percentage of deed self utterances].

1-5:​a. "Punish: The sum of all self utterances coded as 'Punish' divided by the sum of ​all self ​utterances."

​

​b. "Threaten: The sum of all self utterances coded as 'Threaten' divided by the ​sum of all self utterances."

​

​c. "Oppose: The sum of all self utterances coded as 'Oppose' divided by the sum ​of all self utterances."

​

​d. "Support: The sum of all self utterances coded as 'Support' divided by the sum ​of all self utterances."

​

​e. "Promise: The sum of all self utterances coded as 'Promise' divided by the sum ​of all self utterances."

​

​f. "Reward: The sum of all self utterances coded as 'Reward' divided by the sum ​of all self utterances."

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Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905, Princeton University Press (Princeton: 1988).

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Langer, William L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890 – 1902, A.A. Knopf (New York: 1935).

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